NEW TIMES

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

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A SOVIET WEEKLY

NEW TIMES

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From our mailbag

■ I congratulate everybody on the victory of the people! The victory of "democracy in the cradle." It is nice to know that the nation is not a herd, and although the people are not seriously interested in politics, at the critical moment in the history of our poor Russia they made the only right choice. Here we must give credit to our democratic press for its contribution to the victory of common sense and genuine values over darkness.

Though the victory of Democracy is not yet complete, it is still a very imortant step towards a democratic state. The main difficulties are yet ahead. Therefore we Leningraders are not euphoric, but we feel instead quiet joy.

The reaction of our young people came as such a pleasant surprise! When I was called to the Leningrad city council, there were already several thousand people in the square, most of them young people between 15 and 25. They organized everything wonderfully – barricades, duties and measures to prevent possible provocations.

Once again, congratulations!

Victor Gusakov, your regular reader, a worker and coordinator on political and economic issues of the workers' independent movement under the "Democratic Russia" Executive Committee of the Leningrad Region

■ Although I'm not a Communist Party member, I sincerely think Mr Gorbachev marked its epoch. All people then saw a man of renewal, a man who desired to improve things. The people of the world believed him. And he was elected Man of the Year, and little by little he appears to have changed to us. Men, women voted for him, now he must remember that and count with the Russians who allowed him to reach his actual post. He'll be the winner not only by strength, or with military assaults, but only by peace and dialogue. Be human, respect all nationalities, speak and, finally, I hope we'll see fine days for a good future for the people, as well as for himself.

If my mistakes are little ones, I hope you will print my words, these are friendly, human ones.

Awaiting maybe your answer, I continue to read with great pleasure your magazine.

I. Kapetanakos
Tarbes, France

■ The age of Communist oppression, which lasted for more than 70 years in this country, has come to a bitter end. The bank notes which carry the portrait of Lenin evoke unpleasant feelings, reminding one of mass repression against the believers, the destruction of monuments and churches, the dispossessing of peasants, hunger reprisals, and the GULAG. They also remind us of the latest coup. I suggest replacing the portrait of the main Communist on the bank notes with the picture of the Russian White House or the monument to Minin and Pozharsky.

A. Lebedev
the Kirovograd Region, the Ukraine

■ Many Soviet writers advocate "free market" policies as the solution to the problems caused by the old bureaucratic system. However, they usually pay little attention to the problems that occur in the actual operation of the market in the West, in the Third World and in Eastern Europe. "The Market" merely replaces "The Plan" as an object of veneration.

Discussion of these issues in *New Times* has been very inadequate. Information which might cast doubt on "free market" dogma is rarely if ever reported. For example, articles in *New Times* give the impression that Thatcher's policies revived the British economy, whereas, in fact, the average rate of growth of Gross National Product during the Thatcher years was extremely low, unemployment was and remains very high, and there is a serious deficit in the balance of payments.

Similarly, *New Times* shows little recognition of the existence of widespread extreme

Vlasov did not fight against his own people...

■ I read the material, "Vlasov and Vlasovites" in *NT* 44/90 and the response to it (*NT* 23/91) by Ivan Kulikov, who accused Vlasov of betrayal, saying that the general went over to the Nazis.

Those people, who are described as Vlasov's men now, have in actual fact nothing to do with the general. When the general's name became well known in the German-occupied territories, roughly in 1944, the letters "RLA" (Russian Liberation Army) with the flag of St. Andrew underneath were sewn on the sleeves of the soldiers from the Russian battalions of the German army (they consisted mainly of prisoners of war and were dubbed "Hilfswillige"). By 1944 such detachments numbered up to 900,000 men. As for Vlasov, he was kept under house arrest in Dabendorf near Berlin until his meeting with Hitler. He refused to be a puppet in the hands of the Nazis and agreed to cooperate with Germany only as equitable partners. He wanted the Germans to leave the Eastern front and let the Russian army take their place to wage a **political** war on Stalin's regime. In theory, Himmler agreed to this demand during Vlasov's meeting with the Nazi leadership. And only after that could Vlasov organize his own units, which consisted of two and a half divisions and a small Air Force formation. With these people the general moved south early in 1945 – towards Czechoslovakia and Austria, hoping to join the Cossak divisions of Pannwitz and Krasnov. He planned to start an uprising of the Soviet troops in the Balkans after throwing Tito out of Yugoslavia. The only combat action of Vlasov's army was the liberation of Prague from fascists. Therefore Vlasov never fought against his own people. He did not share fascist ideology, which is obvious from his main document – the Prague manifesto. The in-

Take Lenin's portrait off the bank notes

An investigator goes on a hunger strike

poverty in Third World capitalist countries, such as Brazil, Kenya and the Philippines; or of poverty, racism and social decay in US cities.

Nor is there much serious discussion of the economic and social devastation being produced by "free market" reforms in Eastern Europe – especially the massive unemployment in Poland and the eastern part of Germany. This disaster will be repeated in the Soviet Union if similar policies are adopted.

I would like to see a broader range of views represented in the pages of *New Times*. Your magazine sometimes publishes critical letters from readers – but usually these cannot be taken seriously because of their crude Stalinist line. Socialist critics of both capitalism and Stalinism, such as Boris Kagarlitsky, are rarely if ever given a chance to explain their views.

Christopher Slee
Preston, Australia

■ When I read the article "A Prison Riot" (27/91), I was filled with anger and indignation. I felt the same when I read about Nazi concentration camps and the Gestapo. And it turns out that we have the same in this country, which for the past 70 odd years was ruled by people who call themselves Communists. When I think about it, I am filled with horror and shame.

This is ordinary fascism: "They battered me a little, then shouted, 'On the double!'... I ran... and straight into a huge hulk of a man who hit me in the 'kisser,' hard... cops standing alongside a flight of stairs; I was amazed to see two young women among them." The beating was directed by the officers and it was obviously approved by officials of the prosecutor's office, who must have known how such a suppression of a mutiny in the camp might end. I am sure that no criminal proceedings will be started against any of those responsible for the beating. The prosecutor's office will pretend that nothing special has happened. But prisoners are also human, and they are treated with such cruelty that they put out their own eyes. And all these officers and prosecutors must have called themselves Communists, although they are real fascists. Due to these fascist Communists people come to hate all rank-and-file members of the Communist Party.

I am well aware of the state of affairs in the prosecutor's office. I am a lawyer myself and a former investigator of the prosecutor's office. I was dismissed because I wouldn't turn into a scoundrel. In 1981, I was one of the first officials of the prosecutor's office who went on a hunger strike as a result of persecution. Fifteen days later I stopped it because I was promised that an objective checkup would be held, but then Procurator-General of the USSR Trubin did not let them do it.

Illarion Mazur
Ust-Kamchatsk, USSR

■ I read with great interest all the materials about Czecho-Slovakia supplied by your correspondent Inna Rudenko. But since all that she describes takes place in Prague, one gets the impression that she is afraid to leave the capital, or she is not allowed to leave it by her bosses – both Soviet and Czecho-Slovak. And I would like to learn more about life in that country following the "velvet revolution," and what is going on in remote areas, where changes, as in Russia, are very different from those in the capital. Of course, Vaclav Havel is a remarkable man, but it's already boring to read what a modest and great man he is.

I would like to suggest that Inna Rudenko visit the city of Bruntal (North Moravia) so that we could read her report about the life in that city and region after the withdrawal of Sovit troops. The Soveit press says that a tank division from Bruntal was the first to leave. It is also noteworthy that in the years of "occupation," Bruntal turned into a very beautiful city rather than falling into decay. I know this because I served there in 1969 and visited it in 1989. And what is the attitude towards Soviet soldiers of the city's young residents, who were children in 1969-70 and gave concerts in Soviet barracks and were very friendly with our soldiers. I remember that the military commandant of Bruntal, Captain Gromyko, was the first Soviet officer in Czecho-Slovakia to have married a Czech woman. I wonder if he still resides in Bruntal?

Anatoly Karpus
Ryazan, USSR

***Compiled by* T. Chernova**

THE WAY I SEE IT



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

dependent Swiss press wrote about this manifesto that it was the most democratic document ever published in a police state.

As for Vlasov's siding with the Germans, I think that Kulikov simplifies the situation. After the destruction of the 2nd Army (Stalin forbade Vlasov to retreat), Vlasov, who was wounded in the arm, was hiding in the woods. He was given away by a Russian peasant whom the general and his companions had called to have something to eat. Vlasov found himself with the anti-Hitler group of German officers – those who were looking for a chance to get rid of Hitler and finally organized an abortive attempt on his life in 1944. These officers wanted the Russians to fight against Stalin and find "a Russian de Gaulle."

Here we approach a difficult question: was Vlasov a traitor or not? France signed a peace treaty with Hitler and capitulated. Therefore from the point of view of the then government of Petain, general de Gaulle was a traitor who broke the officer's oath and raised a mutiny against the government. That's how it would have all looked today if, God forbid, Germany had won the war. But the war was won by other forces, and de Gaulle tried his teacher Petain. And wasn't it a betrayal on the part of Lenin to accept the services and money of the German General Staff in 1917? And if the attempt on Hitler's life had succeeded and Vlasov, having received freedom of action, had raised a mutiny in the Soviet Army, Stalin's regime had collapsed and the general or another one of his people had come to power? What would have happened then? Perhaps the Germans would have been paid some reparations, but what are they compared to the Brest peace? Would Kulikov have called Vlasov a traitor then?

D. Pospielovsky,
Professor of Russian History
at the University of Western Ontario, Canada

It is difficult to preserve the Union, but even more difficult to destroy it

Valery Tishkov,
Director of the Institute for Ethnological Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences

Will it be possible to avoid repeating the tragic experience of one sovereignty in 15 smaller versions?

Although the leaders of the putsch promised not to impose a state of emergency in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics and Yanayev announced the support of the putsch by the autonomous republics, the putsch was a threat to the national movements among the non-Russian population of the country.

"The cynical speculation on national feelings is nothing but a disguise for attempts to satisfy ambitions" – this was how the putschists characterized in their "Appeal to the Soviet people" the complicated and profound process of the union and autonomous republics gaining sovereignty. It might have been expected that a statement like that would have aroused concern in leaders of these republics, but the course of events, as well as the demarcation line separating the participants in this historical drama, proved much more complicated.



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

A new Russia

The basis for mass movements and political demarcation in most union republics was the national idea and ethnic nationalism in its pro-communist or anti-communist forms professed respectively by the old or new political elites of dominant ethnic groups. The main vector of political struggle was directed vertically – "upwards" against the Russian-speaking centre and "downwards" against ethnic minorities or the so-called non-autochthonous sections of population. Probably it's only in the Ukraine and partly in Azerbaijan that the principal controversies were between the national communists and the national radicals.

In Russia the situation was fundamentally different. The national idea hadn't gained wide popularity in this huge polyethnic formation having a very high percentage of one dominant ethnic group – the Russians.

What are the reasons for this? The first reason is the multinational composition of the powerful democratic circle which has been formed during the *perestroika* years in Moscow, Leningrad and a number of other large cities and which in fact has headed the process of democratization on the union-wide scale. After the 1990 elections to the republican and local organs of power and the presidential elections of 1991, the line of main political confrontation reached beyond the walls of the Union Parliament and ran between the Union centre and Russian leadership. The national aspect was of practically no importance here, and in addition, the Russian leadership seemed more international than the jingoistically minded part of the central structures of power backed by the leadership of Russia's Communist Party. The Russian Yeltsin, the Ukrainian Stankevich, the Greek Popov, the Jew Zaslavsky, the Chechen Khasbulatov and many other democratic leaders just couldn't have played the "national card" since they expanded the ideas and principles of common civil freedoms and common civil sovereignty.

It was practically for the first time that there appeared in the text of Russia's Declaration of Independence an understanding of and a formula for national self-determination as a self-determining common citizenship – a multinational people of the Russian Federation. However, the formation of Russia's new self-consciousness was to face a whole set of obstacles.

The Pridnestrovie Republic, non-existent de jure, is now a political reality. Not only Moldova experiences national minority troubles. What are the ways to solve them?

TASS photo

First, the "legitimists" loudly voiced their demands to restore the legitimacy of the pre-revolutionary Russian state. Their ranks included not only Russian jingoist patriots, but also pamphleteering scholars and writers.

Second, there opened a powerful "internal front" represented by ethno-national movements in Russia's autonomies, whose pro-Communist elite more often than not sided with the central bodies of power.

Third, there was also the underdeveloped character of Russia's republican institutions and attributes of statehood whose functions in the Russian Federation had been performed by the centre since the very moment the Union had been formed.

An outside challenge was necessary which might help promote the process of Russia's self-determination. It was provided by the events of August 19–21. It was probably the first time that the words "Russia" and "Russia's citizens" acquired a special significance and clearness. It was then that Russia's self-awareness regained its national (not ethnic!) symbols: the Parliament, the flag, the Guards, the sacrifices and the altar.

The reaction of the periphery

Leaders of Russia's communist-dominated autonomies supported the putschists. Only the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Komi Republic declared its loyalty to the legally elected supreme bodies of power late on the night of August 19. Leaders of many Union republics, with the exception of the Baltics and Kirghizia, adopted a wait-and-see attitude towards the junta. The putschists were practically supported by those republics where the leaders and the parliamentary majority were Communists (Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan). The loyalty to the communist dogma which had garanteed the exercise of power before the putsch in these republics proved stronger than either solidarity with democracy or the threat of restored totalitarianism.

The greatest sympathies on the part of these republican leaders, including Azerbaijani A.Mutalibov, were gained by the putschists thanks to their promise not to impose a state of emergency or to settle inter-ethnic conflicts on the basis of the *preperestroika* status quo. L.Kravchuk in the Ukraine, N.Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, M.Snegur in Moldova and L.Ter-Petrosyan in Armenia preferred to soothe the population of their republics with the promise of sovereignty. This is how co-chairman of the Russian Social-Democratic Party O.Rumyantsev characterized their position: "It's difficult to accept as ethically sound the thesis 'our sovereignty is what matters, the rest is Moscow's fib; no emergency committee concerns us as long as we are left alone.'" The popular humour didn't fail to comment on it:

Halloo, Kravchuk and Nazarbayev!
You were pleased with Yanaev.
You neither cried nor pleaded,
And now you've suddenly seceded!

The leaders of autonomous regions in Georgia and self-determining formations in Moldova (Gagauzia and Pridnestrovie) found themselves in a delicate situation. The logic of opposing the bodies of power in their Union republics urged them to side with the new "Soviet leadership." One shouldn't forget, however, that it was a question of attitudes of the leaders who lacked sufficient political experience and therefore, facing a problematic situation, failed to define at once positions reflecting aspirations of wider sections of the population and political forces which lead to rallies and dismissals of leaders in some republics.

Democratic Russia was supported by radical nationalist bodies of power in the West Ukraine, the Liberal Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the Ittifaq movement in Tatarstan, activists in the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, the Vainakh party in Chechen-Ingushetia and some other social organizations and movements.

The fall of the putsch and the victory of Russia's leadership, the actions taken by B.Yeltsin and later by M.Gorbachev against the CPSU leadership meant both the end of this party in the centre and also a catastrophe for republican national Communists. The desire to retain power prompted many of them to immediately rid themselves of the communist prop, and, taking advantage of the centre's paralysis, they made an unconditional

transition to the nationalist political platform.

But the most important events were connected with problems in their relations with the centre and Russia, not the fate of the CPSU.

A new and unexpected process of breaking with the centre was initiated as early as the days of the putsch when Estonia, Latvia and Moldova proclaimed their full state sovereignty on August 20 and 21. But this was the logical conclusion of the entire political course followed by the leadership of these republics supported by the wishes of the majority of the population and proven by the results of the plebiscite in the Baltic republics. A sensation was caused by the sudden dash towards independence by the Ukraine and Kazakhstan and subsequently of Byelorussia and the Central Asian republics.

The end of the Union?

Almost 300 million inhabitants of the USSR woke up citizens of 15 new states on the morning of September 6. At least this was the feeling inspired by the resolutions adopted at the congress just adjourned. It was difficult to preserve the Union, but possibly, it will be even more difficult to destroy it. States are created by people who have resolved to form a civil community in order to guarantee the most favourable conditions for their common existence. So far nobody has succeeded in working out or speculatively defining the optimum way of creating states, still less of abolishing them. Only approximate prerequisites are clear. One of the most important among them is the ethno-cultural factor. Its essence consists in that the ethno-cultural communities (peoples) that exist on this earth strive to shape their existence by means of not only life-sustaining economic systems and those of transmission of cultural information but also by means of institutions of power, including that of a state.

However, states are territories marked with borders which in most cases cannot coincide with boundaries marking cultural and linguistic areas. States try foster common loyalty from their citizens through common symbols and dominant cultural stereotypes. The loyalty of citizens of national states provides for cultural pluralism among them. Such national states prove more viable and achieve prosperity. The former Soviet Union failed to solve this problem. Will the new formations be able to avoid repeating this tragic experience in 15 smaller variants?

Delineating borders?

The new sovereign states will have to face at least three thorny problems.

The first one. So far the disintegration has been superficial, on the level of a big political game, as a result of efforts made by intellectuals and political and social activists who managed to lead the majority. But this is far from sufficient to form a basis for new independent states. Here the size of the territory in question and possession of natural resources are not as important as the confidence of the population in the correctness of their choice.

And what if large numbers of closely-living citizens declare a different option? Are those who have achieved sovereignty on the basis of the right to self-determination ready to extend the same right, or at least their right to autonomy, to other groups who are aware of their otherness? For instance, to Hungarians, Bulgarians and the Carpato-Russians in the Ukraine, to the Siberian Tatars and Germans in Russia, to Koreans and Uighurs in Kazakhstan, Lezghians in Azerbaijan, and other such groups.

This list is much longer than politicians suspect because ethnicity is capable of being born anew, of being formed on a purely regional basis or on a basis of a common (and more often than not, purely fictitious) tradition. If society encourages not freedom and development of cultures but ethno-nationalism by creating national states for each of these groups, the movement for self-determination, which includes the desire for power and the end of unequal status, will continue indefinitely for those who are termed "ethnic minorities" in new states.

Second. "Minority" status will be by no means recognized by "fragments" of large peoples sometimes numbering many millions in the states that have seceded. This concerns primarily the Russians, 6.3 million of whom live in Kazakhstan and are the majority in six regions of this republic, 11.3 million of whom live in the Ukraine, mainly in the ethnically complex and culturally mixed fronteir zone, and are the majority in the Crimea. The same may be said about the Ukrainians in Russia, Moldova, and Byelorussia; about Russians in Latvia and Estonia, not to mention the explosive "strip-populated" area in Central Asia, especially the region along the Tajik and Uzbek border.

"Minority" status is inacceptable for these sections of population because nearby, across the state border, lives the main bulk of their kin. In such cases, especially under unfavourable social and cultural conditions, appearance of so-called irredentism is highly probable, that is of a movement for union with one's compatriots. This is usually the most dangerous reason for and form of ethnic conflict.

Irredentism for union with Romanians is already observed in Moldova, as well as among certain parts of Russians in Estonia and Ukrainians in Pridnestrovie. However, in such regions as Northern Kazakhstan, Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea it may gain momentum on such a scale that the extraordinary visits of A.Sobchak and A.Rutskoy to Kiev and Alma-Ata and the corresponding agreements will mean nothing.

Mass migrations, as well as other forcible methods, will not help here. Revision, or, to use a more fitting word, specification of borders (and by no means territorial claims, for it can only be a question of the desire of some citizens concerning territories of their own states) can be the only, though very complicated, way of settling such conflicts.

Third. This concerns the fate of the vast, and at times more influential than politicians, polyethnic section of humanitarian and technical intelligentsia in the centre recruited from all republics, especially from the Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia. Tomorrow tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of talented, well-educated and widely-known people will lose their habitual and vitally important socio-cultural space of the Soviet empire. Their Motherland will be beyond the borders of Russia, and what will their citizenship and social status be in the face of the unconditionally dominating Russian milieu in sovereign Russia?

Nationalism has always been less widespread among Russians, the largest people of the country, than among other ethnic groups. But after formation of sovereign states the Russians, compared to other peoples of the same numerical strength (over 100.000.000), will find themselves in a definitely unfavourable situation, with a considerable part of the territory populated by them being a foreign land or that belonging to sovereign autonomies of Russia who also dream about independence. The growth of Russian nationalism and movements for self-determination of the Russian nation may quite easily share in the experience of analogous processes taking place among other peoples.

All this is worth considering in order to reduce the probability of another putsch.

A portrait of a Sun youth in twilight

Georgia's stormy developments reached a new high with the arrest of prominent oppositionist Georgy Chanturia. President Gamsakhurdia is now on the warpath

Gennady Ariyevich,
our special correspondent

Tbilisi is buzzing like a beehive. Its main stem, Rustaveli Prospect, is blocked by barricades of buses and greyslabs of concrete as well as by pickets and patrols. On one side placards "The President Must Go!" on the other "Gamsakhurdia's enemies are Georgia's enemies!" Georgia is split right down in the middle into two hostile camps. Paradoxically enough both dovetail on the main issue, that of the attitude to independence. Both are convinced that there can be no reintegration with the Union, that even membership in the economic community is nothing but a trap. The actual issue, which is expanding the implacable animosity, is who should serve as the rallying standard in the advance towards independence. Today President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, only recently idol of all, who secured 86 percent of the total vote, is, in the opposition's view, not so much achieving independence as establishing a republic, whose image in the eyes of the world public would be one of a repressive dictatorship.

How come that in the space of but a few months an acknowledged leader who for the Georgians symbolized the struggle for national deliverance from Communist dictatorship, has come to reveal such contradictions? A piddling specimen of the tasteless flattery of Gamsakhurdia is to be discovered in the newspaper *Tbilisi* when it says: "Batono Zviad's life is a heroic and dramatic poem, a repetition of the history of that legendary Sun youth, who having saddled the villainous giant's steed sets off into a nest of serpents in search of the water of life."

"A life that is a poem"

However there are other views.

This well-educated man, who is fluent in several foreign languages, and who conducts press conferences for foreign newsmen in English, is presumptuously sacking specialists and intellectuals and is surrounding himself with incompetent "yes-men."

This incorrigible anti-communist, who himself suffered from club law, is in effect reproducing that self-same totalitarian regime which so summarily jails opponents and dissidents, sacks intransigent journalists, terminates the printing of Moscow-based newspapers as "totally unnecessary," and calls on the leadership of a "hostile" state to chastize the Moscow press for "circulating misinformation."

This opponent of centralized economy, who censured the deliberate hook-up with, and dependence of, Georgia's industry on other Soviet regions is obstructing economic reform and privatization and, as ex-Premier Sigua has claimed in his widely current taped underground interview is relying on the Mafia.

This republican leader, who was first to arrogantly set up his own armed force in the person of a national guard, dispatched his Foreign Minsiter Murman Omanidze to Moscow during the putsch to meet Yanayev and, as far as one can judge, was ready to evolve a common language with the State Emergency Committee.

Such are the points I have heard made in Georgia. This creates a not very attractive image in the eyes of the West, with whom Georgian diplomats so intensively seek contact. (It is said that Georgy Khoshtaria, the previous Foreign Minister, was sacked precisely for failing to ensure a meeting with President George Bush.)

"While Gamsakhurdia is in the saddle," I was told at the headquarters of the National Democratic Party (NDP), which has undertaken to unify the opposition, "nobody will recognize Georgia's independence."

The finishing touches were added on September 2, when, unprovoked, riot police and the presidential guard clubbed demonstrators and with tommy-gun fire abortively sought to disperse another of the many NDP rallies. On the contrary,

Tbilisi riot police at the ready

Photo by Yuri Mechetov

the crowd trebled. At the outset the authorities blamed the demonstrators for these developments claiming that they had fired the first shots. They were declared criminals and drunken louts, while the people hurt were alleged to be chance victims of provocateurs. However, this failed to click and now riot police commanding officer Major Zaur Sakhvadze, who was notorious for his ruthless actions, is made the scapegoat.

Yet the Gamsakhurdia-ites are convinced that this image is distorted, that it is created by his adversaries who are encouraged by Moscow and by "Kremlin agents" intriguing in the democratic press. When I voiced astonishment at such reasoning, which seemed old hat, even myopic with respect to the changes occurring in the country, I was patiently told that Gamsakhurdia represented an awkward partner for the Kremlin which would find it easier to cope with its problems without him. Further, even if Georgia will have to be released, the Kremlin seeks at least to defame its legitimate authorities so that the West fear to have any dealings with them. Which again means that the microscope is at fault for the intrigues of the microbes.

Yet Gamsakhurdia's fans, of whom there are no small number, are willing to admit his "mistakes" or at least explain the absence of a movement towards democracy. Thus the trades school graduate appointed trade minister was soon found guilty of large-scale embezzlement. Further, with no proper explanation the President's press service bluntly notes "in polemics" that three "bankrupt" Russian-language newspapers are now being merged, with another four Georgian-language newspapers following suit, to comprise one big colourful edition. "Generally speaking," Nika Cherkezishvili, chairman of the republican Union of Journalists, told me, "the President developed his style in uphill political confrontation, in the process of polemics. He is still as relentless towards enemies as before, which is why he is often sharp-tongued, does not mince words and often sounds harsh. Not all understand that."

The "twin-tented" parliament

Yet those who do not understand may not speak out in either the press or on television. When I asked Gela Lezhava, first deputy chairman of the Department for Television and Sound Broadcasting why, I obtained an answer, that is astounding for its condescending attitude towards the common people and its servile flattery of the top men. "Georgia is still not ready for democracy," he explained. "Our feudal communist country has become a democratic republic. However, democracy implies responsibility and intellect, but today they do not exist in Georgia with its European-Asiatic culture while human mentality has not been conditioned by age-old democratic tradition as is the case in Western Europe. Which is why the masses see democracy as anarchy. We need might, unity and authority, which are hard to secure by democratic means. However, when we do achieve that and the spirit of the people rises up as a result, democracy will arrive." Evidently the Georgians will have to patiently wait some 73 years.

By now 27 Georgian parties and movements, including some from the ruling Round Table coalition have put forward a united demand for Gamsakhurdia's resignation. They include among others Gia Chanturia's National Democratic Party, Irakli Tsereteli's National Independence Party, and Irakli Shengelaya's Liberty Bloc. These parties comprise quite a mosaic, but though they differ in their stance and attitude to issues, in their outlooks and social composition, they see eye to eye in that the top executive must go and that new elections must be appointed. The impression is that the opposition, though rapidly gaining confidence and though seeking like the notorious State Emergency Committee to get rid of the President, true desirably by constitutional means, has no definite positive programme. Should there be one it goes no further than rectification of Gamsakhurdia's mistakes. Yet, in passionate

Tamara Chkheidze:

"Gamsakhurdia has turned the national idea into an ugly thing"

Our reporter, Alexander Sokolov, has interviewed Tamara Chkheidze, a board member of the Ilya Chavchavadze Society, which is one of Georgia's opposition parties.

Q. Please detail your attitude to developments in Southern Ossetia.

A. The problem erupted out of thin air. There were never any serious differences between Ossetians and Georgians. True, the Ossetians did raise some unfair demands, but there was nothing serious, except for a few isolated cases. Gamsakhurdia exploited the situation to heat up tensions, which he tried to do yet during Communist rule. However, several times then we managed to avert deterioration. Current were rumours that the Ossetians were supposedly planning to attack the Georgians, while in Southern Ossetia, it was believed that the Georgians intended to attack the Ossetians. Gamsakhurdia organized rallies in regions bordering on Southern Ossetia and called on the people to arm.

We may state with every responsibility that in cahoots with Zviad Gamsakhurdia the then Communist leadership engineered this provocation, to wit the march on Tskhinvali of columns of trucks from Tbilisi and other Georgian cities, merely to inflame the atmosphere, which they managed to do.

Already after the advent to power of the Round Table and its leader Gamsakhurdia, the forces that sought to stage a new Karabakh were able to take more resolute action by speculating on Georgian national sentiments.

All other opposition parties agree with us that the autonomous region should have not been abolished. Though from the historical angle the region is an artificial communist creation as no state ever existed there, though Ossetians have been living there for centuries, in the given political situation its abolition was a provocative move.

Q. We hear that Zviad Gamsakhurdia has ordered the prosecution and arrest of Southern Ossetia's leaders, that loyal National Guard units have been moved there, and that furious exchanges of gunfire have commenced anew.

A. Gamsakhurdia constantly exploits the "eternal enemy" and "internal enemy" images. Generally speaking, his technique has always been to stir up national hysteria, but nowadays he is not as good at that as he was before. People are tired.

Q. What is your opinion of the Turco-Meskhetian issue?

A. That is a most tragic problem, as these misfortunates are actually of Georgian origin, which is historically demonstrable and arouses no question. Over the decades the Soviet leadership wilfully misinformed the public that they were Turks. This policy was energetically sustained by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who as a dissident, believed the problem of the repatriation of the so-called Meskhetian Turks and aid for them a basic political issue. Suddenly he has de-

A government that hides from the people behind the police is not worthy of its people." Gamsakhurdia said that when a dissident. But what does Gamsakhurdia think now as President?

TASS photo

lared them Turks. This provoked genuine ysteria in Georgia, as dislike of the Turks of a historical order, as they encroached pon Georgia more than once. Our Ilya 'havchavadze Society was the sole organiation to champion the right attitude nereto, but because of that Gamsakhurdia as proclaimed us traitors.

Q. Do you think the already apparent unuestionable changes and likely advent to ower of the opposition will serve to termiate Georgia's interethnic conflicts?

A. That would definitely help, as the unridled touting of animosity between Geor-ians and non-Georgians was typical of toilitarianism, which still continues in Geor-a. The consequences of the conflicts will e felt for years to come. What has been deolished in the relationships between eorgians and Ossetians cannot be reored at once. Yet when a government that eliberately aggravates the situation will have gone, a solution will gradually be evolved.

In the hands of totalitarianism ideology serves merely as a tool. Now you have a nationalistic ideology in place of the former communist ideology, though in effect everything remains as it was. I would even say that the new ideology is more dangerous than the communist one, as it desecrates the national idea. Gamsakhurdia and his retinue have turned the national idea into an ugly thing. We said "communist" before, but say "national" now. That's the only difference.

Interviewer
Alexander Sokolov

Tbilisi, September 7, 1991

arangues at rallies he is often qualified as "KGB agent."

The intelligentsia, who held aloof so r, have only recently joined the opposon.

One issue of no mean importance is hose side the National Guard and the olice will take. Hurt by their miserable istence and unable to forgive Gamakhurdia for his complot with the "ocupationists" during the putsch, the 5,000-strong National Guard is now alost fully beyond the President's control. says it will not let riot police come out gain against the people. Its commanding ficer, Tenghiz Kitovani, and the new Dence Minister who has an 8,000-strong rce of Afghan veterans at his disposal (it as said that this force might be ordered to orm National Guard barracks in the Tbilisi suburb of Shavnabad) have agreed to cooperate to forestall bloodshed.

Thus far the Georgian parliament has been but an amorphous docile body, which Tbilisi folk have nicknamed "twintented" by reason of the tents pitched on the steps of Government House to accommodate Batono Zviad's enthusiastic admirers. However, even in parliament an opposition, though yet not a very large one, is gaining ground. It is headed by Nodar Natadze, Popular Front leader and Chairman of the Democratic Centre faction. The inaugurated emergency session will largely clarify the alignment and the tactics of the different sides, even though the current situation has been shoved to the bottom of the agenda as evidently not of moment. A parliamentary compromise appears hardly likely though.

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НОВОЕ ВРЕМЯ

The foreign debt burden: our common legacy

The Union is no more, but common economic problems, which no Republic can solve on its own, remain

Gennady FILSHIN, First Deputy Minsiter of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation, interviewed by our correspondent **Tatiana Lekhto**

New Times. The West is now concerned about who is going to pay off the USSR's debts. Our creditors are surprised, to put it mildly, by some politicians, including those in very high places, who suggest that the foreign debt be shared out among the 15 Republics. Is that at all possible?

Gennady Filshin. This information is incorrect and, besides, nothing of the kind is technically feasible. None of the Republics has ever intended to pay off its share of the foreign debt. Back in July all the Republics announced, at the level of the working group of the Inter-Republican Currency Committee, that they were going to honour the Soviet Union's foreign debt jointly, in a centralized way. This debt amounts to over 60 billion to Western countries and over 17 billion dollars to Eastern Europe and other countries. We are now in a critical situation; oil export has dropped dramatically (by 50 percent as against the first half of 1990). The corresponding figures for oil products were 52 percent; non-processed wood, 42 percent; ferrous metals, 67 percent; and this is representative of the majority of other products as well. At a preliminary estimate, the situation will become even more complicated next year: our export resources will not exceed 30–35 billion convertible rubles, and our expenses involved in honouring the foreign debt will constitute their essential proportion unless urgent measures are taken.

Quite soon, on September 23–25, representatives from all the 15 Republics are to gather to discuss all the aspects of joint foreign economic activity. I think that the fulfillment of all the commitments previously undertaken by the Union on the Republics' territories will be high on its agenda. We should not repeat the mistakes of the past: I mean the refusal to pay the tsarist government's debt or to cover our lend-lease indebtedness. The Republics fully realize this, and now an intense effort is being made to determine each Republic's share in the USSR's overall foreign debt.

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

N.T. In what way is the debt pay-off quota to be determined?

G.F. Actually, this is a question of paying the interest, not the debt proper. We have agreed in the working group on the quota being composed of four indices: the given Republic's share in national export, in everall import, in the total population and, finally, in national income. Why these indices? Here are a few examples to illustrate. If the quota depended solely on the size of a Republic's population, Russia, which accounts for 70 percent of import and export and for 51 percent of the country's population, would be in a privileged position as compared with other Republics That is, it would pay only a half of the interest on the debt while possessing a very high export potential amounting to three-fourths of the national figure. That would be unfair as regards the other Republics whose economies developed largely on the "division of labour" principle for which Russia shoulod bear its share of responsibility. On the other hand, if the quota were calculated on the basis of the export-import index only, Russia would bear a heavier burden in proportion to the share of the debt it has actually used. After all, Russia exported not only food and consumer goods, but also equipment which served to meet national needs.

N.T. What if a Republic refuses, nevertheless, to pay

off its share of the debt, or proves unable to meet its quota?

G.F. So far, not a single Republic has declared anything of the kind, and hardly will. A protocol signed by all the Republics has confirmed that they are prepared to honour all the commitments of the Soviet Union. The protocol says that the Republics shall enter their quotas in a special account of the national Bank for Foreign Trade with a view to centralizing the pay-off procedures. So our Western creditors may rest assured that as a debtor we remain a single entity. There is no alternative to that. The mechanism will work as follows. The Republics will have to levy a tax on their enterprises' hard currency earnings. The most important thing is that this should be done openly and publicized. Characteristically, all of us pretend to have been robbed, but the robbers are somehow not in evidence. Therefore, the Republics' Supreme Soviets should declare, for all to hear: this is our share of the national debt, this is the profits tax which we are entering in the Foreign Trade Bank's special account.

The question has been raised of certain Republics being unable to meet their quotas. These Republics will have the choice of either borrowing the money from the West, or signing bilateral agreements with Russia on the Republics meeting a part of that hard-currency quota in goods which our Federation is short of: food, raw materials for the light industry, and other resources. Russia is against the "common stock" method which gives everyone the feeling of being robbed, on the one hand, and, on the other, makes it impossible to monitor the use of credits and contributions to debt pay-offs, as is now the case. Even I, a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Budget Planning Commission which, incidentally, is responsible for the currency situation in the country, have never obtained, for all my efforts, full information about the foreign trade activity of the Union. I repeat, therefore, that we need publicity so that all should see that we are prepared to pay off our debts, that we are not in chaos. What our Western creditors fear most is vagueness on these questions.

N.T. An American paper alleged the other day that we have no solvent bank. The Bank for Foreign Trade has lost its power, and in the ensuing vacuum bankers have lost their bearings; as a result there is the prospect of the bottom falling out of the Soviet Union's import market. Could you comment on that?

G.F. The Bank for Foreign Trade is solvent. What's more, Russia is prepared to support it in every way, to help maintain its reputation and credibility abroad. Plans are now being made to raise the ruble's exchange rate at which hard currency is purchased from enterprises and organizations. This will help reduce somewhat the losses incurred by, for instance, timber exporters who are obliged to sell the hard currency they earn.

N.T. What will this exchange rate be?

G.F. Today the ruble's exchange rate is 1.80 per dollar, and we've got to raise it to three rubles per dollar, to begin with. We have to make extremely rational use of these hard currency receipts. No more than 40 percent of the enterprises' hard currency earnings should be spent on honouring our foreign debt, buying technologies for the food industry, raw materials for the import-oriented light and textile industries, importing medicines and building up a minimum national reserve. And it should be left to the enterprises themselves to decide what to do with the remaining 60 percent.

N.T. Why not set a realistic ruble exchange rate? Won't that solve a lot of problems automatically? Incidentally, this will get the basic industries and the timber enterprises interested in increasing the output of their export products. Many economists are of the opinion that a dollar actually costs five rubles...

G.F. Today this is impossible, our finance system is too unbalanced. By the way, ex-Premier Pavlov suggested a most radical way of making the ruble convertible: to compel the enterprises to sell to the state 60 percent of the hard currency left after the sale of the obligatory 40 percent. The Republics resolutly rejected this suggestion.

In order to make the ruble exchange rate truly realistic and reflect the ratio between our domestic and world prices, we should open wide the market of material and technical resources. Our raw material, fuel and energy prices are too low. They should be brought closer to the world ones. I think, however, that this will be a gradual movement. The most important task now is to stop the wasting of material and technical resources by the military industrial complex. The MIC's research and development organizations should concentrate on making modern weapons – and at the defence sufficiency level only. The resources relieved as a result should be marketed.

The current ruble exchange rate is speculative and comes from a multiple excess of demand over supply. This is done on purpose by offering an extremely limited amount of dollars for sale at official hard currency auctions. Therefore, the Republics should agree on building up a ruble stabilization fund in dollars. Our Western partners could give us a hand in this because they are also interested in stabilizing the exchange rate of the ruble. If such a fund is established, then we shall be able – initially, I think to keep the ruble exchange rate within the range of 7 to 12 and, later, 5 to 7 rubles per dollar.

N.T. So far, the domestic convertibility of the ruble exists only on paper. What can be done about it in the near future, today?

G.F. We shall not be able to do without buying and selling, on a massive scale, food and consumer goods for Soviet money. I mean transfer deals with Western businessmen, which is a realistic proposition as evidenced by the many offers we get. The rubles thus earned can be reinvested in our basic industries and enterprises. This is a good supplement to credits. ■

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Abaddon takes off his dark glasses

The August putsch and the military industrial complex

Konstantin Pleshakov

First of all I would like to make one point dear: I'm not a pacifist. It is rather naïve to believe that we do not need any military industrial complex (MIC) at all. Of course, there is no and there never has been any threat from the West that the President's protegés Kryuchkov and Yazov tried to scare us with. Yet new and rapacious centres of power appear along our Eurasian borders. From here, from our former periphery, comes a threat to our and universal security. If we had a tête-à- tête with the West we might discuss the question of our unilateral disarmament. Today, however, we have no right to raise this question.

Of course, our MIC is swollen beyond measure, it deprives us of the last crumbs and threatens us with a butt. Yes, it should be reduced, maybe even regardless of symmetrical reductions on the American side. But our Euroasian perimeter must be included in the equation of our security and independent experts must decide what should be preserved in order that the Union or its successors might be able to guarantee the security of the former "Soviet" geopolitical space in the future.

But now we are concerned with another matter, namely, with the MIC being left completely uncontrolled. And with the fact that it was exactly the MIC that organized the August putsch.

Formerly we feared the Party which had the MIC under its firm control. Now the tail has began wagging the dog, so to speak. If the MIC remains uncontrolled we will have one more putsch and this time new putschists, who have assimilated the lessons taught them by their ill-starred predecessors will not mark time for three days but will strike a well-aimed and merciless blow no live chains will be able to prevent.

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

Two members of the State Committe for the State Emergency (SCSE) were straight from the MIC – Baklanov and Tizyakov – two names that mean nothing to the public at large. They are two suspiciously obscure persons. However, there are reasons to believe that no other than Baklanov was the mastermind of the putsch or at least was in the centre of the plot. The Army left alone is incapable of accomplishing a coup. It was the MIC's coup. Why is Baklanov's role in it so little spoken of at present? Is the MIC going to pretend to be a mere phantom? It should be borne in mind that it was Baklanov who was entrusted with representation of the junta among the four who rushed to the Crimea to deliver an ultimatum to the President.

The omnipotent MIC and the impotent Central Committee

By August 1991 nobody controlled the MIC. Being left to itself it had become extremely impertinent in Russia. American liberals used to say over and again that there would be no coup in our country because there had been no tradition of military coups in Russia. They were not convinced even by Chile's experience – that country had no tradition of military coups either. As soon as it was left without control, the MIC immediately developed a corresponding tradition.

Let's begin with Gorbachev. According to his occupational position as well as by his professional experience, he should have at least been aware of what was going on in the MIC. He should have had his people there and should have been on the alert, not to mention his duty as the Commander-in-Chief to have it under his full control. Yet there was nothing of the sort. Khrushchev was forced to resign by the Party. Gorbachev was going to be forced to resign by the MIC which had become the real power in the society after the bankruptcy of the CPSU.

The situation in the democratic camp was but little better. Yeltsin said after the Vilnius events that Russia needed an army. According to Freud, slips of the tongue are never accidental. Yeltsin felt that sovereignty is an empty notion without an army. But at the moment Russia couldn't have one, which meant that at least contacts with the MIC were necessary. I say it once again: the MIC is not an expletive but a natural existing phenomenon which can't be abolished but should be civilized. It is clear why Colonel Rutskoy played so important a part in the resistance to the

putsch, it is clear how correct Yeltsin's choice was when he was looking for a comrade-in-arms as Vice President. However, there were no real contacts with the MIC. Directors of military enterprises remained on the side of the rightists. No work was conducted with the Army, which resulted in confrontation. MPs communicated with soldiers once the putsch has started – a bit too late.

To whose profit?

Many years ago Milovan Djilas wrote about a "new class" in socialist countries. Unfortunately we have not so far accurately found out the parameters of this "new" exploiting class in our own society, being satisfied with such senseless terms as "apparat," "bureaucracy" and "rightists." We can tentatively formulate in the most general way that our "new" class is made up of those who exercise control over national wealth and the functioning of the system of social relations (exploitation) which guarantee their leading social and economic position in society. Until approximately 1989-1990 the backbone of this exploiting class remained unchanged – it was the Communist Party. Two or three years ago there appeared the first serious symptom of the Party being unable to secure the interests of the "new" class and by the summer of 1990 it became evident that the power of the CPSU was deminishing like the shagreen skin. The life proved that the CPSU had missed the train: the putschists left the Party aside.

Another grouping came to the fore in the "new" class – the military industrial complex representing the upper strata of the Army, the defence industry and structures connected with them. Unlike the Party, the MIC was better fit for struggle under new conditions. The power of the Party was based on forming purely authoritative relations with society, and these relations – or, to put it bluntly, this regime – began to collapse with the first free elections in the spring of 1989. The power of the MIC was more tangible because it held in its hands the better part of the nation's economic potential and cooperated with the institutions of control over society – the Army, the KGB, and the Ministry of the Interior. The MIC, which until 1989-1990 was dependent on the Party and had to be compliant with its demands, was now free. The MIC made an attempt to stop the process of the redistribution of power (including economic power) in the country. An ideological disguise was practically absent from the SCSE-issued orders and decrees, it had decided to rely on itself.

A beerputsch without beer

The MIC was engaged in a desperate attempt to save the "new" class and what is rather inaccurately termed "privileges" and is in fact the sweet portion of the national assets alienated from the society. We forget that here it is not only a question of power. Power as such is appealing to rather few. The majority sees in it not so much a source of irrational pleasure as a definite method to pick up sweet crumbs, if not a slice.

It is evident that the MIC does not incorporate the greater part of the Army (what does a Vologda guy get from the Army apart from beatings and, possibly, a bullet?); however, the rank-and-file of the Army are the MIC's instrument. Nevertheless the machine did not work during the putsch. Many refused to crush people only because Yazov had ordered them to. But one should not yield to illusions: some part of the MIC evidently realized the senselessness of the putsch and decided to save themselves for future battles.

Many are jubilant now. There is little reason for it. Euphoria is a dangerous state in troubles. It was the first putsch, and only a very naïve person can doubt that there will be new attempts.

A democratic society is manaced with two dangers: populist dictators from "below" and the MIC from "above." In a long-term perspective populism is more dangerous because this is something new, whereas the MIC is fraught with the "old." But at a certain point these two forces must almost inevitably join. A populist dictator will boast of his patriotism. He will not be able to use his party alone as a support. If he manages to win the MIC to his side and conclude an agreement about a way to share the cake, the MIC will gladly support the "popular" dictator with both money and arms. However, there is not much use writing about all that. Suffice it to open a school text-book and read about the developments in Germany from 1923 to 1933. You will make sure that a "beerputsch" has already occurred in our country. M.Bulgakov wrote in his famous *Master and Margaret* that Abaddon removes his dark glasses to produce lage-scale bloodshed. Abaddon has already taken off his glasses.

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Don't say "Yes" or "No"

The abortive coup has revealed that the political and economic reforms are not protected legally and the Committee of Constitutional Supervision has no real power

Prof. *Anatoly Naumov*, LL.D.

The actions of those who headed and carried out an unconstitutional coup deserve punishment under several articles of the criminal code. The position of the Committee of Constitutional Supervision on the criminal putsch was expressed in a statement of its chairman and members: "Similar measures *can* (my italics) be justified legally only if the Constitution and other laws of the USSR are strictly observed." It was also stated that before deciding to consider and give a legal assessment of such measures, the members of the committee inquire of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR whether or not it intends to consider the question of endorsing the decree on the state of emergency.

So the conclusion is then dependent on whether the Supreme Soviet approves the powers of the absolutely criminal junta. Does it mean that the indisputable question was not clear to the committee before a decision was made by the parliament? The body for constitutional supervision proved legally timid and helpless, and it is surprising. I shall refer to Article 1 of the Law of the USSR on the Legal Regime of the State of Emergency. It contains an exhaustive list of situations in which a state of emergency can be declared: natural calamities, large-scale accidents or catastrophes, epidemics, epizooty and mass riots. There are no other reasons for declaring a state of emergency and, thus, the decision of the putschists was unlawful. And the Committee of Constitutional Supervision must have stated so.

Unfortunately, the committee did not adopt a firm and principled stand, even considering the fact that part of its statement was deleted by "emergency" censors. It is not the first time that the committee can be reproached with being timid and helpless in safeguarding the Constitution. This timidity, bordering on compliance, could only persuade those who violated the Constitution that they will remain unpunished. I have in mind here the actions of those who later headed the putsch.

Let us recall the order issued by the interior and defence ministers at the end of last year. They decided to organize the joint patrolling of streets by policemen and servicemen. Under it, "servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy equipped with firearms are appointed for joint patrolling in cases when the situation is aggravated, including public unrest;... Office cars and armoured personnel carriers must be fully used for joint patrolling." The decision of the two ministers went beyond the appropriate limits even if we make allowance for our by no means legal traditions. They acted as if the country had no president or parliament.

The situation assumed a tragic character in connection with the events in the Baltic republics. Not self-styled authorities (the two ministers who assumed the functions of other bodies) but legal authorities should have expressed their attitude towards the above-mentioned order, that is, either to repeal or endorse it. President Gorbachev preferred to display solidarity with Interior Minister Pugo and Defence Minister Yazov.

After that the Russian parliament resolved to ascertain the legality of the order by asking the Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR to draw its conclusion on the constitutionality of the presidential decree.

The committee fulfilled this task in two stages. In the first stage it firmly kept to the well-known principle: don't say "Yes" or "No." The committee pointed to the absence of "a clear legislative definition of grounds and procedure for the use of armed forces of the USSR within the country in conditions when the state of emergency has not been declared." For this reason the committee decided to ask the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to draw up and adopt legislative acts that would "determine the limits and procedure of the use of the armed forces of the USSR and its servicemen for the settlement of internal conflicts and the protection of public order."

The committee did not use words "constitutional" or "unconstitutional" (it promised to do that later), though the unconstitutionality of the above-mentioned order was virtually admitted in a timid and concealed manner. The committee recalled that under the Law of the USSR on the Legal Regime of the State of Emergency, adopted on April 3, 1990, "in exceptional cases, by a decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or the President of the USSR, military units of the armed forces of the USSR and the KGB of the USSR *can* (my italics) be used together with Interior ministry troops for eliminating the aftermath of extraordinary circumstances, protecting public order and ensuring the security of citizens." The question is simple, therefore. Interior ministry troops and army units **can** be used by a decision of the parliament or the President, not the two ministers. They **can** be used only in one case, if the state of emergency is declared somewhere.

Thus, everything was clear. It was also clear, however, that the President should be backed. It is for this purpose that the committee discovered a legislative flaw, namely, the absence of legal regulation of the use of the army in everyday, not emergency, situations.

Incidentally, the good wishes of the committee can be understood in a different way – let every day in our life be an extraordinary day. It appeared that, in the opinion of the committee, this flaw in the law should have been corrected by legalizing the extraordinary police functions of the army and making them an everyday occurrence. It is clear today that it was a manoeuvre on the brink of a precipice.

In the second stage the committee noted with satisfaction that the Supreme Soviet paid heed to its request to eliminate the legislative flaw and legalize the everyday extraordinary situation and passed the following decision: "Since the Law of the USSR on the Soviet Police has defined the grounds and procedure for using servicemen for the protection of public order, the consideration of the question ... is completed."

The committee referred to Article 9 of the Law of the USSR on the Soviet Police,

Drawing by Arkady Gursky

adopted on March 6. "In cases envisaged by the Law, servicemen can be drawn for carrying out measures, coordinated with the republics, for the protection of public order and security," this article states. In the opinion of the committee, with the adoption of this Law the presidential decree on joint patrolling has become quite consitutional. What about the formal legal aspect of the matter?

Let us turn again to the text of the Law on the Soviet Police. It links the drawing of servicemen for the protection of public order with **cases** "envisaged by the Law for carrying out measures, coordinated with the republics, for the protection of public order and security."

So far, luckily, we have one law of this kind, the Law on the Regime of the State of Emergency. Now everything clicks into place. The state of emergency must first be declared so that the army can be drawn into the carrying out of police functions not characteristic of it. The state of emergency should naturally be declared on legal grounds, not as the putschists did it, that is, in flagrant violation of the law.

I think the competent members of the committee noticed this contradiction. However, political motives prevailed over legal grounds. The argument can easily be imagined: "The President is in a tight box. He must be backed." What about building a **law-governed** state, the **supremacy** of the law? Just empty words?

The idea of setting up the Committee of Constitutional Supervision seemed like a good one. According to the Constitution of the USSR the committee is elected by the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR for a term of ten years so that it will not depend on other higher bodies of authority, the President included, so that it can rise above political passions and affections by using law as the only instrument of its activity. However, the reality is that on the pages of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Literary Gazette) the chairman of the committee publicly declared his support for the President. Of course, nothing human is alien to the chairman as a person. He could make known his support for the President in a telephone conversation, in a letter or during a meeting with him. However, he should have abstained from doing so publicly. The President comes and goes and the chairman of the Committee of Consitutional Supervision will remain an eye-witness to his accession to power and resignation.

Can it be imagined, for instance, that the chairman of the Supreme Court of the United States (which exercises constitutional supervision) would make the President a declaration of support through the media? This is difficult to imagine in the United States but it is possible in our country, though, with a human touch, everything can be explained. The decision to declare the decree unconstitutional objectively means joining the "chorus" of people criticizing Gorbachev from the right and the left. This can deal a blow to *perestroika* on the whole. Does it mean that such a decision should not be adopted? What line of action should be taken? Saying "A" in one case (failing to see the unconstitutionality of the decree), the committee quite firmly says "B" in another. It did not comment on the government's decision on the temporary suspension of rallies and demonstrations in Moscow and refrained from assessing its constitutionality. Incidentally, the implementation of this decision made clear the essence of the order issued by the defence and interior ministers. In strict conformity with this decision rallies and demonstations can be interpreted as "an aggravation of the situation." It then became clear that the order was issued not for the purpose of combatting crime but was designed to suppress political freedoms gained in the course of *perestroika*.

Hardly anyone will deny that in the two episodes described above it was in fact a repetition of the recent putsch. The significance of the position of the committee would be more important than considerations of whether to support the President or not. However, the committee kept silent...

The Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR must finally draw its conclusion on the constitutionality of the Russian President's decree banning the functioning of the organizational structures of political parties and mass movements in government bodies, institutions, and organizations of the Russian Federation.

The initial reaction of the committee was quite traditional. Having succumbed to the influence of the party's so-called experts and champions of human rights, the committee, before considering the matter, asked the Russian President to postpone implementation of the decree. Thus, it **already** found something wrong in the decree, for why else would it request that implementation of the latter be postponed?

Events developed so rapidly that one could almost certainly suppose that if the committee drew its conclusion before the putsch and the decrees of the Soviet and Russian presidents on the suspension of the activity of the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, it would be **compelled** to admit the constitutionality of Boris Yeltsin's decree even a that time. It could not draw a different conclusion.

The reasons for the committee's legal helplessness (in ordinary, not extraordinary conditions) lie in the law under which it was formed, in the established procedure of accepting decisions and their juridical force. A sound view was expressed by those who, when the draft of this law was discussed, insisted that constitutional supervision should be linked with judicial power, that the committee should have the right to veto any unconstitutional act. The recent tragic events have confirmed that a reliable legal mechanism should be created for safeguarding the Consitution.

HUMAN DIMENSION

Thorny road to Europe

Currently Moscow is the venue of the CSCE Conference on Human Dimension. The post-putsch fuss now and again leaves us with no time to stop and think why this is all necessary. After all, who wants to listen to the harangues at the Moscow Hall of Colums or learn about the hours-long pow-wows of experts and working groups?

This Moscow meeting in something that we living in our partly European state need above all. We have only tasted of freedom as the mainstays of this country's past seventy-odd years collapse. Indeed, since the conference is for this country not just one more token of our European existence, but the beginning of our real tangible integration with Europe.

This development, however called and however many sovereign republics it might integrate, begins with recognition by our politicians and citiziens of values common to all mankind and with a willingness to abide by these values in political and social life. It begins with the acknowledgement that these values take precedence over the laws operative at home, that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states comes second inborn human rights to life, freedom and property.

Should the state fail to halt the ethnic conflicts between Armenians and Azerbaijanians or between Georgians and Ossetians and should in the Dniester Valley, the rights of the Russian-speaking population be indeed infringed, surely it would be best at this juncture to try to terminate the bloodshed by inviting UN or CSCE observers.

Is human life really cheaper than non-infringement of state sovereignty?

Generally speaking, these questions arose long ago, but an honest solution is regrettably by no means easy.

Because what we must first admit is that we are a whole era behind Europe in our level of civilization.

Moscow Conference brings politics closer to man and the country to world civilization

Yet a time will come when we shall have to start living in Europe not as a purely geographical entity. Integration with Europe needs start with an understanding of what we really are. Soviet diplomacy may be credited for the results achieved over the past six years despite its shilly-shallying, it has brought politics closer to man and the country to world civilization and has likewise brought – or perhaps dragged? – society and the state to accept the platform of the Conference on the Human Dimension and the realization that values common to all mankind come before the narrow ambitions of the state. This is so even though our society, a closed society but recently will no doubt find it hard to accept the thesis the Moscow meeting has proclaimed: that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries is no absolute value but one that must give way should human rights be encroached upon.

This has been said in Moscow, yes, in Moscow at last.



Even the geography has changed in the month since our Estonian colleague Peep Pedmanson brought along this drawing to our Editorial Office

A suitcase without a handle?

What the ministers took away with them from the Moscow Conference

Galina Sidorova,
New Times Political Analyst

At a cursory glance it might appear that again discussions were not to the point. For that was the way it was started in Ottawa yet when though the subject was the "open sky" regime, what the Foreign Ministers of the Helsinki states actually discussed was the German issue. The paramount issue at the Moscow meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension was human rights, but again the ministers debated recent developments in this country and their consequences. All that one can say is that abortive putsches and revolutions do not occur every day even here. Still, we may note a definite logic in that, developments over recent years have outrun not only planned diplomaltic action, but even the boldest idea of what the future may bring.

At the time of its adoption in January 1989, the Vienna document, which established the fundamentals, including the guidelines for the current Moscow meeting, had seemed to offer a code for affairs in Europe over the coming 21st century. But two years later, the situation drastically changed.

Thus at their June meeting in Berlin the ministers engaged in customary squabbles over the status for which representatives of the Baltic states were eligible. However, in Moscow today Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are fully represented. There are already 38 of us and tomorrow still more might be added.

The meeting voiced plaudits for victorious democracy, Russia, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yeltsin, Gorbachev, etc. Meanwhile in the corridors and offices of the Kremlin and the Russian White House as well as of other key institutions, where the ministers flocked when not making their own statements, mostly questions were raised, with moreover the dominant theme not our pet subject of who had manned the barricades on August 19–21, but who was really ruling the country and what its prospects were.

US Secretary of State James Baker definitely packed most into his visit. Again he showed that despite the unlimited legal and illicit sources of information about our country available he preferred to get to the root in person. Thus, he met Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Silayev and his colleagues at Union and Russian levels, paid a courtesy visit to the KGB, and called on his good friend Eduard Shevardnadze, moreover at the headquarters of the Democratic Reform Movement, now as one of the leaders of the opposition. He also called on the mayors of Moscow and St.Petersburg, paid a flying visit to Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, and, finally, went to the independent Baltic states.



In expectation of James Baker, Union Foreign Minister Boris Pankin told newsmen that after the Congress of People's Deputies the ball was now in the Western court. This alerted me: is it really true that matters again rest with the West?

On the next day after his meeting with Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, James Baker was exceedingly diplomaltic when I asked him whether he noted any difference in the approaches to Soviet-American relations between the Russian and Union MFAs. I think, he said, that President Yeltsin and President Gorbachev are working very closely together trying to deal with some of the very complex questions about the future of the republics and the future of the Union, and are trying to deal as well with the very important economic questions that face the Soviet Union and the Russian republic as they seek an economic revolution equivalent to a political revolution in this country.

I have watched James Baker at many Soviet-American meetings of minsiters and also at international gatherings, but I think this was the first time that despite his impeccable diplomatic tact and protocol assurance I detected a barely noticeable apprehension, so uncharacteristic of this "hardboiled" clever, strong-willed and customarily restrained politician.

After the talks the customary kind words were addressed to our leaders and their bold reforms. The long-awaited bilateral statement on the termination of arms deliveries to Afghanistan was read out. The Soviet party announced intentions of pulling troops out of Cuba, while James Baker said he was willing to negotiate on tactical nuclear weaponry in Europe.

Yet I could not help feeling that the Americans were in their way looking around for a lost partner. They are perplexed by the number of presidents we have, and wonder at the quibbling between the representatives of the democratic forces and the fog still enveloping economic reform. They are frankly frightened by the lack of absolute clarity as regards control over the nuclear button and perhaps no less so by the dexterity with which some nationalistic leaders adapt the remnants of the collapsed Communist structures to their own needs. As British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd put it, a desire for independence does not necessarily mean a desire for democracy and human rights.

Hence, when we stop to think about it all, in Moscow the ministers, though preoccupied with Soviet affairs, really did not veer so far away from the initial subject. On the contrary, they approached it from the opposite side as it were. Since the example of the multinational Soviet Union and Yugoslavia shows that at times of upheaval, even should greater rights be desired, the danger of the infringement of human rights increases.

The experts are still working. Meanwhile the ministers have left Moscow with apprehension and perhaps still more so with feelings of discouragement. They are perturbed by the vigour with which the republics, intoxiated by their newly-won freedom, are shoving one another aside to get closer to the European-American feeding trough. It looks as if the Americans no longer hook up economic and technological assistance with concrete reform and are prepared to take us at our word and be content with intent and commitment. But as always, the ball is in our court. After all, for them today we are in effect no partner but rather a suitcase without a handle, which is hard to carry, though to let go of it would be a pity, the more so as it is filled with nuclear contents, which make that by no means safe to do.

Though with a less harsh regime, the GULAG still exists

Is haggling with the authorities over the lot of political prisoners appropriate?

The two approaches of the human rights movement to the Moscow meeting were dramatically opposed. The "intransigents" were dead set against its organization in Moscow and were prepared to picket it, as they maintaining that as the state did not guarantee human rights the host government might try to get away with murder. They contended that such a meeting would measure up to the Helsinki documents only if held in countries where human rights are really observed, which the Soviet Union never was.

The "moderates," though, thought that with Moscow as its venue this meeting would at last impel the discussion of the vital issue of human rights in all seriousness. It was their conviction that this would be an advance to the Soviet state, yet they could not visualize prospects without compromising with the authorities, without haggling with them over the lot of political prisoners.

The abortive August putsch failed to produce a common stand among the human rights advocates, some are as "intransigent" as before.

On the day the Conference opened, Mordovian camp No.35, where most of the political prisoners are confined, declared a hunger strike. "To take part in this meeting is to betray comrades still languishing in confinement," says Soviet human rights advocate Andrei Mironov.



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

Mironov himself was a political prisoner in that Mordovian camp. In 1985 he was sentenced to four years in the Gulag plus three more years of internal exile under Article 70 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code, to wit, antiSoviet agitation and propaganda, for circulating Shalamov's *Kolyma Stories* and Shafarevich's *Socialism as a Phenomenon in World History*. After 18 months he was pardoned in February 1987. This is how he describes his release:

"On the second day of the CSCE Vienna Conference of December 1986, the West posed the ultimatum that either the Soviet Union free all political prisoners, or talks would be called off. Several days later our camp regime was alleviated and I was released from the punishment block. The next three weeks were spent feeding me up in KGB interrogation block. All in all, some 140 prisoners were released. The remainder were left until later. Afterwards more were sentenced. Even those released were not reinstated, which would have implied penalties for all who wrongfully imprisoned them, but pardoned, though I for one never asked for a pardon."

Proceeding from his own personal experience, Mironov takes a sceptical view of the statement issued by the two Presidents, of the Union and of the Russian republic, during the Soviet-American TV hook-up that 21 political prisoners had been amnestied. He described it as "one more propaganda ploy."

On the other hand, Lyudmila Alexeyeva, a founder of the Moscow Helsinki group, who emigrated to the USA in 1977, where she published a book entitled *The History of Dissidence*, is not that categoric. She believes "we must bargain with the authorities and try to have all political prisoners released."

It must be said that the statistics she and the American Helsinki group possess are at variance with Soviet data. She was astonished when she learned that the list of prisoners Boris Yeltsin is to amnesty contained but five names, as she estimates there are now "around a hundred political prisoners" in the USSR.

Alexeyeva takes a favourable view of the Moscow meeting. In this connection she has recollected the Vienna meeting, at which the then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze proposed discussing human rights in Moscow. "That was totally unexpected, even impudent," she says, "since to hold such a meeting would mean encouragement and acknowledgement of a state's services in the human rights area. The Helsinki Final Act was signed by totalitarian regimes as well, but the difference between them and the democratic countries is tremendous, and it was thought that the struggle for human rights would be an uphill one."

Lyudmila Alexeyeva reckons that in the USSR some 900 political prisoners were released in 1987 and 1988, and for that alone she considers the Helsinki process a success.

But Dmitry Leonov, chairman of the Memorial associations human rights commission, says:

"As I see it, the CSCE meeting should not have taken place in Moscow, as no really serious changes have occurred in the human rights field in the USSR in recent years. Indeed, after the putsch, the respective situation is yet worse. I mean the closing of several newspapers, the detention of people for sympathizing with the putschists and occurance like the search conducted in the home of the USSR People's Deputy. It is most perturbing when executive authority replaces legislative authority, especially at every level."

Last April, the Memorial association issued an appeal, declaring that to hold the meeting in Moscow would be "inappropriate." It proceeded in particular from the judgement that there is still a large number of political prisoners in Soviet jails, that the state continues to use armed force against the peaceful population, that the President issues edicts encroaching upon citizens' rights and that conditions in the GULAG are inhumane and, in effect, amount to torture.

However, after the putsch, the Memorial association resolved to take part in the meeting's alternative actions in order to have the international public know the data it possesses. However it has emphasized that its undertakings have nothing at all in common with what such public organizations as the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies and the Soviet Peace Committee may be doing. In collaboration with the American Helsinki Watch group, the Memorial association arranged its own hearings in Moscow. Meanwhile Janie Olson of the California Helsinki Watch group believes the Moscow meeting will at least induce the Soviets to finally and unreservedly acknowledge the priority of human rights issues.

Konstantin Isakov

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A year without Communists

Why does the defeat of Communist governments not lead automatically to the victory of democracy?

A year ago non-Communist governments came to power in several republics of Yugoslavia. After the 45-year undivided rule the Communist parties are now in the opposition. What has changed during the last year?

The situation in Croatia has changed, of course. The ruling Croatian Democratic Community came to power because it appealed to national sentiments and promised "a bright non-communist future."

However, the conflict between the Croatian leaders and the republic's Serb population has escalated into bloodshed. The new athorities urge the Serbs to be loyal to the regime but do not want to make any serious concessions. It is therefore difficult to expect even the slightest support for the Croatian authorities on the part of the Serb population. The shadow of genocide committed by ustashis during the Second World War still hangs over the relations between representatives of the two nationalities.

Having gained less than half the votes in the elections, the Croatian Democratic Community, thanks to a special counting system, secured for itself an absolute majority in the parliament, and began to reorganize life in the republic according to its own criteria. During the past year the Croatian parliament has smoothly adopted hundreds of laws. As in the not too distant past, people loyal to the ruling party have been appointed editors of republican newspapers and have made them mouthpieces of the Democratic Community. The independent TV channel will the Yugoslav orientation has been declared "anti-Croatian" and, hence, hostile. The notion of "party solidarity" is used again, it differs from the former communist principle of centralism in name only. The numerous committees of the Democratic Community set up throughout the republic have assumed the functions of former district party committees.

Having adopted the slogan of its predecessors, "Every revolution must be able to defend itself," the ruling party has begun to form para-military units while not renouncing illegal purchases of weapons abroad. Military reviews attended only by the leadership of the republic have become traditional.

The new society required new leaders. The former idols have been replaced by new ones. Huge photographs of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman are displayed in the republic's towns and souvenirs with his bronze profile are sold everywhere. The portraits of the leader hang in all offices of "grateful employees." Recently the main republican newspaper *Vjesnik* made its readers happy by publishing a richly illustrated book about Tudjman, containing many photographs "from his social and private life." On buying the book (the publishers do not doubt that it will sell like hot cakes), the readers will be able to enjoy looking at the father of the nation while he "shaves his face, visits his native town, or engages in one of his three favourite pursuits."

It will be more difficult to carry out the promises of economic prosperity. Despite millions of dollars flowing in from Croatian emigrants, the economic situation in the republic has not changed for the better. Something familiar can also be discerned in the Democratic Community's calls to the people to reconcile themselves to the present state of affairs "for the sake of a bright (non-communist) future." The draft of the law on citizenship proclaims that "only he who accepts Croatian culture shall be recognized as a citizen of Croatia." This statement is associated in people's minds with a more distant past.

The transition from one system to another does not proceed smoothly in other republics of Yugoslavia, either. In the struggle against the "communist past" power is often assumed by politicians who have learned well national slogans but think little about daily bread and democracy.

Ironically enough the opposition often won an absolute victory in areas inhabited by the privileged sections of the former regime. The residents of these areas evidently measured the socialist ideal so fervently championed by them in the past by the size of their offices. They quickly revised their views in order to retain their high posts. However, the difference between "Comrade Jovanovic," the former first secretary of a district party committee, and "Mr Jovanovic," the present head of a district mayor's office, seems very insignificant at times.

The ordeals of Yugoslavia in its post-communist period show that a certain transition period lies between the former regime and a civil society. Democracy does not come immediately. Not infrequently such a period acquires a national-authoritarian character. But, as an ancient philosopher once said, only absolute authority with legal powers is more dangerous than absolute authority without legal powers.

Gennady Sysoyev,
our own correspondent
ZAGREB – BELGRADE

On the road to Zagreb...

Soviet tanks on the Tropic of Cancer

Pulling out in good time

The pullout of Soviet troops from Cuba marks the beginning of the new policy with respect to the Castro regime

The military unit of 3,000–plus servicemen that was called "a combat brigade" in CIA reports and "a training centre" in our documents in reality was not such a centre and, according to specialists, had no significance for the USSR as a combat unit because of its remoteness. It was stationed there in accordance with Cuba's wishes, as a substitute for the missiles that had been removed from Cuban soil long ago.

Consequently, it can be regarded as a part of military aid to Cuba that annually received some 1.5 billion rubles worth of arms and equipment. That sum was recorded, but the thought of payment has never even crossed the mind of either side. How could one raise the question of payment when Moscow got, particularly out of the blue, a springboard of world revolution in the Western hemisphere, unquestionable proof of the advance of socialism and the crisis of capitalism, a fraternal island off the southern coast of the US that is said to bear great expenses because of the proximity of the Communist regime.

Judging by the fact that Cuba was supplied not with state-of-the-art weapons, Moscow General Staff did not think much of the 200,000-strong Cuban Army's fighting potential in the probable confrontation with imperialism. Yet a friendly beacon in a long cruise or flight was most welcome, although in the end the USSR did not dare to build a regular naval or air force base there. And especially welcome was the eavesdropping station, which, accordingly to Soviet military experts, was simply indispensable. It is included in the brigade which was stationed on the island and which, along with military aid to Cuba in general, was quite justified in light of strategic confrontation with the United States.

But then came the time when we began to take a fresh look at socialism. The country began to rid itself of the vestiges of totalitarianism, which will not be eliminated completely if we confine ourselves to our home turf. The support of totalitarian regimes would not be consistent with today's ideology. Moreover, the withdrawal of support may prove to be insufficient. In relations between states, the stability of the principle of non-interference in the case of human rights violations is already being called into question. It is not yet clear under what circumstances and what kind of sanctions are to be adopted, but there is no doubt that this is already in the cards. Strictly speaking, the USSR has always brought the light of freedom to other peoples. History simply gives it one more chance.

For the time being, though, the idea is that Soviet-Cuban relations should be mutually advantageous and should not impede the improvement of the global political climate. The brigade did hamper such an improvement and it has to go. To stop spending money on Cuba, Moscow can now easily claim that it simply cannot afford it any more. And even if in proceeding from the doctrine of the defence sufficiency it is established that after all there is a need for a centre of electronic intelligence on the island, such an argument will change nothing. The familiar imperative – sorry, but you have to do it – has acquired a new meaning, but remained no less urgent.

It would be good to effect relations with Cuba in the new, civilized manner. Cubans are justified in their indignation that they have not been notified in advance about the coming withdrawal of the brigade. On one occasion Moscow provoked Havana's anger when it failed to give it advance notice of the decision to remove missiles, but at least that was during the missile crisis. One can find comfort, though, in the fact that the present decision was accompanied by the one to discontinue arms shipments to Afghanistan. It can also have uncertain consequences if other suppliers of arms do not join the Soviet-American embargo. But sooner or later one has to make up his mind so that the standard Soviet slogans – peace and democracy – become at long last a reality on Afghan and Cuban soil.

In any case, with the exception of procedural blunders, Cuban authorities have no cause for protesting the new Soviet plan. As far back as two years ago, when Mikhail Gorbachev went to Cuba, Fidel Castro said that if the Soviet Union wished to build capitalism, Cuba had no right to take exception. It was also long ago that Castro began to prepare his people for a total cut of Soviet aid that he called the "zero option." He predicted that option in the case of a serious internal crisis in the USSR. Well, the August putsch fits that definition perfectly.

Does the Cuban regime have a chance to make do without Soviet aid? Absolutely. Even without weapons. The two thousand tanks that have already been shipped there will serve it for a long time. And although the six MIG-29 fighters will soon be laid up for lack of spare parts, a way out will be found. Cuba is not getting Soviet food in any case, and with its sugar, nickel, cigars and beaches it will be in a position to buy a little oil in addition to what it produces itself, provided they do not impose an international blockade. Fidel Castro maintains that in his country everything is provided for should that also become a reality. After all, it is always warm there, and one can gather in three harvests during a year. Socialism will be built on the island under any circumstances.

Apparently it does not become Moscow to encourage Castro in his undertaking. But what will be its next step? To recall two dozen military advisers (not long ago there were ten times that number)? To bring back Soviet invalids crippled in the Afghan war from the orthopaedic hospital in Havana that was built with Saddam Hussein's money?

Lately this country had to carry out some extensive pullout programmes fulfilling a difficult duty both for itself and the world – to vacate the place it had fruitlessly occupied.

Vitaly Sobolev

Qui bono?

Today the Middle East has taken a back seat, especially after our August revolution, and the highly developed countries that are prepared to help the USSR to survive have come to the fore.

Yet Academician Evgeny Primakov, who enjoys great respect in the Middle East, has set a course for a substantial tour of the six countries of the South: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iran, and Turkey. It is clear **whom** he represents: Evgeny Primakov is the personal representative of the President of the USSR. But it is not quite clear **what** he represents. The USSR? In the Union they are now trying to solve the questions of economic ties between the republics and the partition of the Armed Forces. And the situation with foreign ties is rather vague. I shall not venture to pass judgement on whether the independent Baltic republics are interested in the all-around improvement of ties with the Moslem Orient, or Turkmenia with the Scandinavian countries.

Dmitry Zgersky

Visits to the Middle East have never been easy, and lately this is even more so. One has only to recall Evgeny Primakov's humiliating visits to Baghdad. Moreover, nowadays Moscow talks to the Middle East not as a superpower, but rather as a suppliant. It even has to ask for what belongs to it by right. Iraq owes the USSR over 6 billion dollars and Syria – about 7 billion. I have visited both countries. Soviet diplomats, there unanimously asserted that we might just as well forget about the repayment of the debts by these countries. Proletarian internationalism has been at work to its utmost: we have been taking away food from our children to give it to the Arab brothers who live much better than we do. The Arab brothers were quite happy about this, living according to the principle "we like help from our brothers." Now many of them do not like us because we have dared at last to become pragmatic too, and have begun to look for friends among those who are not trying to extort anything, but on the contrary are prepared to help. Of course, we are talking here not about all Arab countries. But the haters of Gorbachev and democracy do not include only Libya's Muammar al-Quaddafi, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, and the PLO's Yasser Arafat. "We Arabs," writes the Palestinian weekly *Al-Kifan Al-Arabi*, "will be hypocrites if we do not admit that we wished success to the putshist in the Soviet Union and are disappointed with their failure and Gorbachev's return to power."

Of course, not everyone reasons along these lines. For example, Egypt has honestly paid to the USSR all its debts and maintains friendly relations with it. In Egypt Evgeny Primakov has had negotiations not only on the development of economic cooperation, but also on political interaction with the view of achieving peace in the Middle East. The rich Arab countries in the Gulf also have friendly feelings towards the Soviet Union and have already given it financial assistance. Chances are that this assistance will be extended further. Not so simple is the case of Iran. The commercial credit it is prepared to give is dependent on rigid conditions although its amount is not that great – about one hundred million dollars worth of food-stuff, footwear and textile fabrics. Another factor is represented by the unclear status of the Soviet Union, where the majority of the republics have proclaimed themselves independent. In the past it was Russia that paid with technical equipment for the supplies of Iranian gas to Armenia and Azerbaijan. But who is going to pay now?

Soviet aid to Arabs is put on hold. Now we are waiting for them to help us

Things are going quite well with Turkey, which is striving to join the community of European democracies. Cooperation with that country is developing quickly and has good prospects for the future.

Hence one can assume that Primakov's tour will bring some results, although at present it is not quite clear for whom. Let us hope for all of us. To my knowledge, quite the other tour was planned: the new Soviet Foreign Minister, Pankin, was going to visit Israel to restore full-scale diplomatic relations with that state. But on Primakov's insistence we have turned to the Arab side again. It remains to see what we shall profit from it.

But meanwhile I would like to put forward the following idea. There is no doubt that we need not only material assistance, but also the experience in streamlining the national economy under new conditions system.

In the mid-seventies President Anwar Sadat reached the conclusion that the scientific socialism of Gamal Abdel Nasser had led the country into a impasse under the guidance of advisers from the USSR. He had made the change akin to the one we made today. Moscow then anathematized the Egyptian president for betraying the Arab brothers and for building capitalism. And Sadat once said that he was prepared to sell his soul to the devil if it helped his people to live better. In just a couple of years of Egyptian perestroika, called **infitah**, the country witnessed the appearance of thousands of millionaires. For five years the new rich had been enjoying great tax privileges and rapidly lining their pockets. At the same time the poor started to get more.

With the extremely high cost of living, just like in this country, Sadat created the system of special shops for the poor with incredibly low prices, and we should adopt his methods.

Divorce or discord?

Which of these two scenarios will it be

Mikhail Bezrukov

What must happen did: the Baltic republics gained their independence. They gained it only after overcoming all imaginable hurdles and remonstrations.

It's possible to speculate how things would have gone if the Union leadership had conducted itself differently in the years of perestroika and not so often been a captive of old dogmas and approaches. Nevertheless, the end result could hardly have been different. And not only because the break with the totalitarian model in the USSR was inevitable, and the boundaries of the possible kept widening. In the consciousness of the people in the Baltic republics the loss of their independence had remained an open wound and a return to governing themselves the most cherished dream. They wanted it more than anything else in the world.

The Baltic question long remained a stumbling block for perestroika. Those against it gave three main reasons why it was impossible for the three western republics to break away from the USSR. First of all, there were the close ties that had been formed with the other parts of the country. Secondly, there was a danger of ethnic conflicts between the native population and the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. And finally, the significance of the region for the military-strategic interests of the Soviet Union was stressed.

Old symbols on the way out... *Photo from The Guardian (Great Britain)*

The impossibility of the exit of the Baltics from the USSR was pounded into our heads. Those who didn't understand or didn't agree were given other arguments – right up to the use of military force. And to quite a few it seemed that concessions to the "destroyers of the Union" might bring still more suffering and conflicts.

And now that happened. So, did the day of celebration of sovereignty at the same time become the day of tragedy about which we were so often warned?

Between the beginning of the movement of the three western Soviet republics to separate from the USSR and today, there is a span of time so filled with stormy events that many of the former gloomy prognoses have paled in comparison.

It probably doesn't make sense to emphasize the problem of the future economic ties of the Baltic states with the USSR any longer. Similar destructive processes are observed in our relations with practically all the republics and even inside them.

The clashes on national grounds in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia shouldn't be attributed to something special coming out against the background of the general revival of nationalism in the former "family of

nations." In any case, there is reason to believe that in the given instance they will be settled in a fairly civilized manner according to international norms.

As for the military-strategic interests of the USSR, their very concept is in need of radical revision. Together with the fall of the Soviet empire our country's approaches to the external world formed over the decades have begun to rapidly become obsolete. The Soviet Union in its old form is gone, and its parts – as a whole and taken separately – have entered a period of intense search to find their new place in international relations.

Does all this mean that the warnings of the past few years were all thought up?

It all depends on where you are. It should be admitted that for the Soviet Union which existed until the attempted coup in August, the demand of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to grant them independence was a real threat. They brought into doubt the primacy of the central governement in making decisions about the future of the USSR and thus paved the way for the further disintegration of the country and the final fall of the existing centralized government. This inspired the persistent resistance to the clearly expressed desires of the people of the Baltic states. The former center never did find the strength to back up its own words about the right of nations to self-determination. The decision about the recognition of the three Baltic states was accepted, as a matter of fact, by the heads of the republics taking part in the work of the new State Council.

The independence of the Baltic states as such does not frighten the remaining 12 republics. Many of them have also proclaimed their independence and the list is constantly growing. The action of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia corresponds to the policy of other members of the "indestructible union" in many ways.

It's not by accident that in the critical months of this year it was namely the position of the republics having increased their influence, especially Russia, that became an important obstacle to any attempt to force the Baltic peoples to think better of it with the help of brute force.

The main thing for the republics is the question of what the policy of the three Baltic states will be now. The evaluation of what has happened depends on what course they choose to take.

There are at least two possible scenarios for the further development of events. The first one could be called "East European."

The democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989-90 quickly progressed to an accentuated estrangement of the just previously Soviet satellites from Moscow. There were quite a few reasons for this. Among the most important of them was the desire of the East European leaders to speed up the alignment of their countries with the West by demonstrating a break with their former dependence on the USSR. This line also increased the support of the people for radical internal reforms.

Distancing themselves from the Soviet Union brought certain advantages, however it didn't solve all the problems. Soon serious losses caused by this approach became apparent. The crisis of mutual ties, first of all economic ones, made the situation of the recent partners worse.

Of course such ties can't take the place of relations with the developed Western countries and their amalgamations. At the same time mutualy advantageous cooperation of the sides could and can alleviate the difficulties of the transition period. Today more and more people in Eartern Europe – both politicians and representatives of business circles – understand this.

Will the experience of Eastern Europe be repeated in some variant or another in the Baltic states?

The temptation to follow the same path is certainly there.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are living through a period of stunningly quick recognition from the international community and its institutions. It is as if mankind has come to and is hurrying to show signs of attention and respect to the recent captives of the Evil Empire. The three newly independent states may use this unique historical moment to their avail.

It's possible the flow of aid will even increase if Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia take an uncompromising position with regard to our country on the withdrawal of troops, the fate of military objects, and the problem of all-union property. Just as in Eastern Europe, such a turn, on top of everything else, would help the Baltic states acquire their own image after decades of being dependent.

The cost of such a choice wouldn't be long in coming. And it could be much heavier than what Eastern Europe faced.

It'll be difficult for them to justify it, harder than a year ago. The Soviet Union of former years is no more. There are just republics trying to tackle similar tasks and experiencing the same problems. All parts of the former Evil Empire are sufffering to an equal degree from steps leading to destabilization.

Once someone compared the attempt to break out of the captivity of totalitarianism with efforts to dig out of the pyramids to freedom, pointing out that the structure could fall and kill the fugitives. Wheter it is possible to escape the fatal chaos in the former Union depends on the ability of the republics, and among them the three Baltic republics, to display wise restraint and an openness to dialogue.

This is the second and much more preferred scenario of the future development of events.

Exit Swedish socialism

Electors deny Swedish socialism their confidence

Two countries – the USSR and Sweden – have been experimenting with Marxist ideas for years. Soviet communism committed suicide last August as it tried to prove, for the last time, that its fiasco was the result of a lack of iron-fisted rule. Although Swedish Social Democracy has used much milder methods and achieved impressive results, it seems to have ended up in a blind alley as well. At the September 15 parliamentary elections Social Democrats failed to receive a vote of confidence and lost the majority they shared in the Riksdag with the Swedish Left Party which had recently deleted the word "Communists" from its name.

Ingvar Carlsson, then Prime Minister, reasoned – without success – that Social Democrats had been in office for 43 out of the past 49 years, making Sweden into, perhaps, the world's most industrialized, richest, and freest state. The Swedish public has not forgiven him and his ministers for unprecedentedly high taxes (through which 57 percent of the gross national product was redistributed) and, the main thing, a lack of clear-cut prospects for the country's further progress. The Swedish model of socialism, so much admired by the adherents of the "socialist choice" ranging from Nicaraguan Sandinistas to the Soviet President, began to look exorbitant and non-competitive to most Swedes.

It is true that many here appreciate top-class social security and other guarantees society has provided the individual, but Westen Europe's record suggests that even without socialists who have receded to the background over the past decade modern society can provide a decent life for its citizens, though perhaps not 100 percent of them. The ideas of social solidarity have gradually given way to the slogans of social justice: instead of being guaranteed to all, a high standard of living should be earned by good work. Incompetents or those unwilling to do their best should settle for a more modest life. This is essentially what the bourgeois parties played upon.

Now there will be five of them in the Riksdag instead of three, and they will have a majority of mandates (196 out of 349). Nevertheless, it won't be easy for them to find a common language, especially considering the fact that besides the traditional Conservatives, Liberals and Centrists, parliament sessions will be attended, for the first time ever, by Christian Democrats and "New Democrats." Although the former "behaved themselves" and promised their support to the "Big Brothers" in the efforts to form a government, Alf Svensson, their leader, showed his true colours right after the elections, proving to be not only mild-mannered but also quite tough. "Some people think that all we are concerned about is abortions. Well, they are mistaken," was that Lutheran preacher's meaningful answer to a question about the terms on which he would be prepared to cooperate in forming a bourgeois cabinet.

As I was sharing with Swedish TV audiences my view of the situation in the

The left leaders – the socialist experiment failed

Riksdag, the anchorman of the third channel grinned and offered the seat next to mine to the New Democracy leader Bert Carlsson, the owner of an amusement park who, along with unemployed Count Ian Wachmeister, decided to deliver Sweden from the burden of "old" democracy. Having pulled a loaf of bread out of his pocket, he started to expound on agricultural policy and then, changing to his favourite subject – the country's liberation from socialism – called himself, just in passing, a "Swedish Yeltsin." One can understand Carl Bildt, the prospective head of the Conservative government, who has strong misgivings about including the "new demagogues," as he calls them, in the coalition government. His more serious partners won't hear of them at all.

Nevertheless, politics is not for the squeamish, and the non-socialist majority is compelled, in some form or other, to lean on the "new democrats" who help the right to tip the scales in parliament against the left. As to Social Democrats, let alone the Left Party, Carl Bildt is not willing to cooperate with them. Like fly-agaric, he says, Marxism is poisonous in any dosage. In general, the left have suffered the worst defeat in the history of Swedish political democracy and have no moral rights to participate in the new government.

Well, what is the future of the "Swedish model"? Will it be scrapped or merely given a face-lift? It has taken shape over the years under specific historical conditions, the future Premier replies. Today the conditions have changed – consequently, the model ought to be changed, too. In modern society, Social Democratic methods of solving problems do not work. A look at Eastern Europe and the USSR will show that the world is going not towards socialism but away from it.

Naturally enough, the former head of the country's government does not agree with him. "There is no connection between the fall of communism in the East and the defeat of Social Democracy in Sweden," he says. I cannot tell whether the leader of Social Democrats really means it, but I suppose he is mistaken just as he has been about the foundations of Swedish society being unshakeable.

Well, the Conservatives and Liberals have kept their word: the country is no longer dominated by Social Democrats. It is not, however, so much a matter of these two parties winning a victory as that of socialism suffering a defeat. Now the electors are impatient to see whether the new cabinet fulfills another promise – "a new start for Sweden," which allegedly guarantees unprecedented economic progress, a dramatic rise in living standards and, simultaneously, the lightening of the tax burden. This may turn out to be a false start, I am afraid, because the future cabinet is going to be extremely heterogeneous, and each of the parties comprising it will try to pull the "patchwork quilt" of the potential coalition its way. It may fall apart altogether, if all five parties engage in such a "tug-of-war."

Alexander Polyukhov,
our own correspondent
Stockholm

With whom to conduct talks

Islands in exchange for billions of dollars?

Before the visit to Tokyo of a delegation from the Russian Federation, headed by parliament chairman Khasbulatov, local newspapers carried numerous comments from Moscow on the statements of President Yeltsin and other top leaders of the Federation on Soviet-Japanese relations and especially on the territorial problem. The intention to leave the solution of this problem to the coming generations, reiterated by Yeltsin some time ago, caused dismay here. But the Japanese were pleased to hear Yavlinsky's statement on the need to be guided by the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1855, under which the four islands belonged to Japan. There was a positive reaction after Khasbulatov handed Yeltsin's personal message to Prime Minister Kaifu and called for a speedier solution. Tokyo understood that the Russian leadership had taken a radical and constructive approach to the territorial problem, though it had no intention of turning the islands over to Japan tomorrow.

During the visit of the Russian Federation delegation, I had a talk with a top official of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, who expressed the following opinion:

"In January of last year, Boris Yeltsin put forward his five-stage plan for normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations. Recently, Yeltsin and Khasbulatov have introduced new elements into this plan which can push the matter further. It was originally proposed to leave the settlement of the territorial problem to coming generations. Today they intend to solve it quickly, withot delay.The first stage of Yeltsin's plan has already been put into effect: Moscow has admitted the existence of the territorial problem. It was done in a communique signed by Gorbachev and Kaifu. Measures are being taken to carry out the second and third stages of Yeltsin's plan. Exchanges and ties are being intensified at various levels and in vairous fields, and a gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops from the four disputed islands has started. Thus, two stages remain. In the fourth stage the two countries are expected to sign a peace treaty, and the solution of the territorial problem is left for the fifth stage. Last year Yeltsin named the five stages precisely in this order. Today the Russian leaders talk not only about a speedier implementation of the plan but also about a possible reduction of its stages and a change in their sequence, that is, they display sufficient flexibility. There are grounds for optimism in this respect. Tokyo holds the following stand: "The formula for the solution of the territorial problem should be incorporated into the text of a peace treaty. We are ready to discuss the relevant issues and are open to new proposals. But with whom shall we discuss them? With whom shall we sign a peace treaty – with the Union or Russia, or with the Union and Russia together? This question must be decided by your country."

Russian-Japanese dialogue

While in Tokyo, Khasbulatov stressed that the Japanese leaders should understand that the state of affairs has changed. Sad as it is, the Soviet Union, the central government and its ministries no longer exist. To prevent the Union from the final breakup, Russia, with its traditions of consolidating different lands, should take and is already taking upon itself the functions of the former Union. Hence all relations with Japan can be built only through negotiations with Russia.

In a conversation with Soviet journalists Khasbulatov admitted with evident regret that this reality had not yet been brought home to the Japanese, who persistently inquire about the stand of the Union. All measures and decisions of the leadership of Russia are approved and confirmed by the central administration. "Is it not proof of the authority of Russia?" Khasbulatov asked.

Now, about the billions of dollars to help Russia overcome its economic crisis. Khasbulatov was the first of the Soviet and Russian leaders to state that Russia respected the basic principle of Japanese policy towards the USSR (and respectively, towards Russia, since it, according to Khasbulatov, becomes the legal successor to the former Union), namely, the principle that economics and politics are indivisible. Strictly speaking, this principle means that Tokyo will not agree to large-scale economic cooperation with our country, including economic aid, until a peace treaty is signed, that is, until the territorial dispute is settled completely.

While adhering to this principle Japan, as a great economic power and a close neighbour of Russia, could nevertheless give it aid in its hour of need outside the framework of this principle. It cannot be ruled out, Khasbulatov stressed in Tokyo, that the next coup attempt may prove successful. Such an attempt is quite real if measures are not taken immediately for improving the life of the Russians. It is better now to avert a fire in a neighbour's house than to rescue one's own house from smouldering brands. This logic is quite sound. Will it not be counter-productive, however, to scare the Japanese with one more coup?

At a meeting with Soviet journalists in Tokyo Khasbulatov was asked about the development of legal and commercial conditions for the activity of Western, including Japanese, businesses in the Soviet Union. The chairman of the Russian parliament replied that he was not yet going to take practical steps in this direction. If Japanese businessmen were to tell us concretely what restricts their activity in the Soviet Union, our reaction would be very quick.

For years and even decades the Japanese have urged us directly and indirectly, orally and in written form to remove specific obstacles and make necessary decisions. Shall we continue to wait until some kind soul not only helps us out of our economic mess but also charts out for us the line of action for decades ahead?

Vladimir Ovsyannikov
our own correspondent
TOKYO

A road half-century long



"How did a professional army officer become a top-level politician?" With this question we continue a long talk our correspondent in Warsaw had with former Polish president WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI

Wojciech Jaruzelski. My interests were never confined to military affairs. I always read a lot, including articles and books on political subjects. I also follow cultural events. In the years when it was not a mere formality I finished an evening university of Marxism-Leninism. Suffice it to say that among the lecturers there were such authorities as Professor Adam Schaff (who later left Poland and became a professor at the Vienna University – **R.B.**). In the mid-1950s, having graduated with honours from the Polish General Staff Academy in the rank of general, I was appointed head of the board of higher and secondary military colleges. Then I was commander of a mechanized division. I always continued my self-education. This circumstance was evidently taken into account when I was appointed chief of the main political department of the army. I opposed this appointment as much as I could. However, I was told that this post should be held by a man who combines the knowledge of an army officer with broad mental and political vision, that it was a temporary appointment, and so on. I sighed with relief only after I had been nominated chief of the General Staff, a post closer to my professional interests.

In 1968, having become minister of defence, I had to deal with political problems again, for the post of minister in any field is political to a considerable extent. Under our system this usually presupposed membership in the party's Central Committee. At the end of 1970 I was elected an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CC Polish United Workers' Party. I would not say that I was very active at the meetings of the Politbureau. Nevertheless, I was an ex officio member for ten years. I preferred to devote my abilities and energies to my direct occupation, and I think that at the time of holding the post of defence minister I managed to do something unseful for the army.

New Times. What kind of relationship developed with the Soviet command and its representatives on Polish territory?

W.J. Sometimes we reacted painfully to what was called "limited sovereignty," but we accepted it as an inevitable thing, as a guarantee of the security of our Western borders. It should also be remembered that the Soviet Union gave us considerable assistance in the supply of modern

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weapons and military equipment. I had friendly relations with many of my Soviet colleagues, and I now recall them with warmth. Personally I did not feel arrogance on the part of Soviet military leaders, for we were combat friends. Unfortunately, at other levels relations sometimes developed in a different way.

As for all subsequent events in my life, I don't think it would be absolutely right to say that I became a hostage of circumstances. What I did in 1981 was more like throwing a life belt to the sinking team–government structures and the economy. The hopes for internal stabilization were then linked with the high prestige of the army and with my personal position as a noted military leader. It's a pity to realize that not all my efforts had the desired results.

N.T. Don't you think that the chance to "rescue the sinking team" in the socialist countries was given by history only once – in the 1950s, after the 20th Congress of the CPSU? Poland had this chance in October 1956. It appeared after the return of Gomulka from political exile, and after the eighth plenum of the CC PUWP. I have in mind not so much party decisions and personnel changes in the higher echelons of power as the genuine enthusiasm with which the nation welcomed the statement that totalitarianism would be abolished "resolutely and forever." Later the Communists never enjoyed such mass support. Persecutions were renewed and the party's work was drowned in ideological and hypocritical claptrap...

W.J. It is hard to deny that. We indeed lost the opportunity to transform our system decisively and profoundly. We had that chance in 1956. But then ever stronger pressure was exerted. The Czechoslovak events in 1968 were the culmination of our retreat.

N.T. What decision was the most responsible and difficult for you?

W.J. The imposition of martial law was the most responsible and, simultaneously, the most difficult decision for me. I would also describe as noteworthy the initiative of holding a round table. Rereading the transcript of the last plenum off the CC held in December 1988 - January 1989, I recall how I was assailed by our party hard-liners. They condemned the party leadership and did not want to begin a dialogue with the opposition. It is characteristic that the decisions of that CC plenum returned the party to the fundamental values which it proclaimed back in the 1940s and which I mentioned in the beginning of our conversation. However,we were 40 years late...

We had good intentions, but failed to put them into practice. However, the ideas of socialism have nothing to do with that. The fault lies with those who set about implementing those intentions. The last hope faded away. The majority of the people have lost all trust in our party.

N.T. Now that you are not burdened with the responsibility of the first citizen of the state can we expect that you will frankly tell us how martial law was imposed? Are you prepared to disclose the precise reasons which impelled you to adopt such a grave decision? What was the role of former Soviet leaders in this event?

W.J. I shall refrain from explaining the reasons for my decision because I am going to write about that event myself. With due respect to *New Times*, I would rather not give details in an interview. It was a time of a complex interlocking of domestic and external political and economic, subjective and objective reasons. Without taking all these reasons into account, any interpretation will be one-sided and therefore erroneous. Besides, I do not think we shall obtain full information very soon. For instance, Britain still keeps in its archives documents relating to the Polish uprising of 1863. These documents have not yet been made public. Perhaps they contain information embarrassing for Britain. I don't know. But the fact remains.

N.T. It is well known today that Soviet troops were concentrated on the Soviet-Polish border. There was panic in the offices of the CC CPSU. Soviet citizens, then on a business trip in Poland, as well as Soviet students were hastily evacuted.

W.J. I cannot speak for the Soviet authorities.

N.T. All right. I shall put the question in a different way. If you had not declared martial law on December 13, 1981, would Soviet intervention have become inevitable?

W.J. I would not like to discuss such a serious topic in the form you propose. Historically, our national thinking has been burdened by the stereotype of an aggressive Eastern neighbour who has encroached on our independence during the last two centuries. I have also been brought up in the spirit that the Poles have always had to fight for their freedom. And this has been so indeed. But we should look into the matter more deeply. I watch with anxiety how we are trying to smooth over our own shortcomings.It is true that in the 18th century my country was torn asunder by its neighbours. But why do we forget about our own sin, about the internal disintegration of Poland, which easily fell prey to its aggressive neighbours? Or let us recall the situation in our country before the second world war. It is true that Hitler and Stalin collaborated and that it was a crime against the Polish nation. (Though I shall never bracket Stalin and Hitler together. The great-power ambitions, terror and crimes of Stalin should be distinguished from Hitler's ideology and practice of genocide against Poles.) On the other hand, it is not their fault that prewar Poland was a backward country economically and militarily. How could Polish cavalry counter tanks? I do not mention here self-delusion and excessive bragging. Thus, we should take a sober view of things.

Now about the 1980s. The foreign policy situation was very precarious in those years. If you remember, the world was returning to the cold war. Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, and the United States was installing missiles in Western Europe. Brezhnev was on one pole, and Reagan on the other. The world political climate could not but influence the situation in Poland. Some influential quarters in the West wanted Poland to seethe with unrest, while the East was anxious about the danger of a new explosive hotbed appearing near its borders.

In short, Poland became an arena of political struggle between the West and the East. We had to reckon with this state of affairs, for the Hungarian and Czechoslovak events were still fresh in our minds. However, I am not inclined to put the blame first of all on our neighbour. I want to think over our own guilt before the people, the guilt of the opposition, the Solidarnosc, the ruling party, and my personal guilt. We were unable to find a way to compromise and solve our internal problems in a civilized manner. We were not then mature enough for that task and were forced to make a desperate step. However, without that bitter experience we might not have matured enough for a dialogue and a round table.

N.T. The murder of priest Jerzy Popieluszko is an example of an uncivilized and, I would even say, barbarious way of "settling internal problems." I recall this national tragedy without any intention of "reopening old sores." The death of Popieluszko remains a mystery to this day. In the autumn of 1984 I was in Poland. The terse and confusing reports about the kidnapping of the priest, whose body was then discovered in a storage lake, contained little information at first. Most sober-minded people concluded that the inhuman action was directed against you personally and your close associates. It was directed against those who then tried to reform the existing system and change social relations and dared begin a dialogue with the opposition. What do you feel about that?

W.J. Human life is a value in itself and death, especially violent, is a tragedy. In

those years priest Popieluszko enjoyed high prestige in our society. It is a pity that he expanded his mission as a priest to include also purely political matters. The authorities criticized Popieluszko for his involvement in politics. But he was human, and this says a lot. The murder of a priest is a disgraceful and disgusting fact, especially in view of the atrocious way in which he was killed.

N.T. Where and when did you learn about the murder?

W.J. I learned about the murder next day. Early in the morning I had a phone call from Minister of Internal Affairs Czesław Kiszczak. By that time the chauffeur of Popieluszko had turned up. He said that three persons, one of them in police uniform, kidnapped the priest and took him away somewhere. The chauffeur, a paratrooper in the past, had escaped by jumping out of the car.

I had no doubts even at the time that it was a provocation. I have no indisputable evidence to prove that it was designed against me personally. But objectively the crime dealt a serious blow at the policy which I tried to pursue. The essence of the provocation is broader and you correctly noted that. The entire action beginning with the choice of a victim – a widely known and popular figure who openly criticized the authorities and the system – was directed against the clearly noticeable positive tendency in domestic politics. 1984 was drawing to a close. The economic situation and food supply improved, martial law was repealed one and a half years ago, and the social conflict, the atmosphere of confrontation, became less tense. The authorities and the church began negotiations on the release of political prisoners... In general, some common platform for a civilized dialogue became apparent.

Cardinal Josef Glemp played a notable part in these efforts. I advanced the principle: "It is not important where a person comes from, it is important in what direction he wants to go." And I tried to follow it. In short, the situation inspired hopes for social concord. All of a sudden we were dealt a blow evidently designed to compromise and thwart all our efforts. The blow certainly produced an effect... It should be said to the interior minister's credit (I also played some part in these efforts) that the criminals were caught in an unprecedently short time, and we staged an open trial. A thorough investigation was carried out. The perpetrators were severely punished. No other traces of the crime were found.

The investigation has been resumed of late. It was officially announced that the purpose of the inquest is to ascertain who and with what motives instigated the murder and conducted it. Recently I also gave evidence to the prosecutor. From the juridical point of view, the investigation is being conducted irreproachably. However, I am worried by the dubious tendency in the campaign that is being organized over the affair. The testimony of the convicted persons now sharply differ from what they said before. They publicly declare that they were subjected to pressure, persuaded into giving certain evidence and so on. I drew the attention of the prosecutor to the testimony given, in particular, by the chief defendant, Grzegorz Piotrowski, at the first trial. He explained his actions then in a different way. Piotrowski expressed discontent with the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the country's leadership in general. In his opinion, they displayed needless tolerance and inefficiency in the struggle against the enemies of Poland, especially the clergy. For this reason Piotrowski claimed, he could not remain a passive onlooker. I handed to the prosecutor a letter Piotrowski had sent me from prison. He asked me to forgive him for the damage he had caused to the party, the state and me personally. There is also a letter from Adam Pietruszka (one of the four convicted defendants, a former colonel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the direct chief of the murderer, Piotrowski. He masterminded the operation of kidnapping and murdering the priest – **R.B.**).The letter was sent by Pietruszka to General Kiszczak after the sentence had been passed. (It will be recalled that the court sentenced Grzegorz Piotrowski to imprisonment for 25 years, Adam Pietruszka for 25 years, Leszek Pekala for 15 years and Waldemar Chmielewski for 14 years. In December 1987 the Supreme Court mitigated the punishment. The term of imprisonment was reduced to 15 years for Piotrowski, 10 years for Pietruszka and Pekala, and four years and six months for Chmielewski – **R.B.**).

Brezhnev, Kania, Jaruzelski, Gromyko and Chernenko. Negotiations in conditions of "limited sovereignty"

In his letter Adam Pietruszka reproached me and the interior minister with being too soft in relation to the church and claimed that the defendants had been pushed to the murder precisely by our extremely soft policy and indecisiveness. What do we see today? Having realized that the situation changed, the convicts pose as almost victims of the will of other people. Unfortunately, now that public sentiment has not yet quieted down and certain politicians dream of making short shrift of Communists, talk of this kind may be exploited for propaganda purposes, especially in the run-up to parliamentary elections.

N.T. You have met with Pope John Paul II for the sixth time and, as I heard, on his initiative.

W.J. No, there was mutual desire and initiative. I value such meetings highly. In my opinion, they concern not only me personally. I regard this gesture of the Pope as an expression of respect for all Poles, irrespective of their political views and ideologies. During our meeting we talked first of all about the current problems facing our country. We also touched on questions relating to the Soviet Union. The Pope spoke about Mikhail Gorbachev with sympathy and respect, understanding his difficult mission. Recalling his meeting with the Soviet President, the Pope even quoted Gorbachev's words that changes in the public minds take place very slowly

A military coup the Polish way

and painfully. I noted that I fully share the Pope's thoughts about the Soviet leader and wholeheartedly wish the Soviet Union and its peoples every success on their hard road, because stability in your country is important for the whole world and especially for Poland as the Soviet Union's close neighbour.

N.T. What do you think of relations between our countries in the recent period?

W.J. To my regret, they are not shaping up as constructively as they could. In particular, I am worried about the shrinking of economic ties between our countries, with losses for both sides. The situation in politics is no better. Poles are being swept over by emotions, and I can understand this. One could expect such a reaction after many years of inequitable relations, half-truths and sometimes direct falsification of the past. However, these unhealthy sentiments should not be cultivated. It should be remembered that the Russian and other peoples of the Soviet Union also suffered from totalitarianism on a vast and devastating scale. If we transfer our bitterness to the present-day relations, we shall not see the difference between the past epoch and its rulers and the new epoch of perestroika and its leaders. The people who proclaimed complete openness in our relations are quite another generation of people, and I do not share the narrow outlook that all of them are tarred with the same brush and should be held accountable. Indeed, it is necessary to promote mutually advantageous economic cooperation, withdraw Soviet troops and make joint decisions through competent talks, taking the real possibilities of both countries into consideration.

The Soviet Union should understand that the Poles are very sensitive to the presence of foreign troops in their country. As for us, we should see that the withdrawal of troops is a complex operation from the military, material and simply human points of view. The main thing is that we are neighbours, and there is no way of changing this situation. It would be unwise to rupture the economic, cultural and human ties that have been forged over decades. After all, we have been friends over the past decades. Our countries have cooperated with each other and many Poles have become related to your people. I am sure that sooner or later our relations will return to normal and become truly good-neighbour relations. It was in this spirit that Pope John Paul II spoke during our meeting. The latest statements of Lech Walesa also give rise to such a hope.

N.T. You were one of the first persons whom President Walesa phoned on learning about the putsch in the Soviet Union. When did he call you?

W.J. It was about nine o'clock in the morning on August 19.

N.T. Why did he phone you?

W.J. He phoned many others, not only me. President Walesa asked what I knew about the putsch.

I replied that I knew very little, only that a state of emergency had been declared in the USSR.

N.T. Did he ask you about your attitude towards the coup?

W.J. No, it was rather an appeal to back up common efforts. I replied that I understood the anxiety of the President, that the situation in the Soviet Union concerned not only us, Poles, but also Europe and the world as a whole. I told President Walesa that he probably knew about my attitude towards the Soviet Union, my great sympathy for Mikhail Gorbachev, and that we should closely follow the development of events and react quietly, without getting nervous, but rationally and consistently. I expressed my readiness to support the President in his decisions that might be required by concrete circumstances. Lech Walesa inquired whether I would be in Warsaw in order to find me if necessary. It was a brief conversation.

N.T. I would like to know your opinion as a professional army officer and politician: why did the putsch fail to succeed?

W.J. I am simply unable to talk seriously about the "technology" of staging a coup. Watching the events of the first day on television, I caught myself thinking that it was a spectacle with mechanisms I could not understand. Everything looked like an amateurish attempt. I knew the professional standards of the Soviet army rather well. The conservatism of some of its generals does not deny the fact that its organization and technical equipment measure up to the world standards. And suddenly we saw a feeble attempt. First, the coup leaders did not intern the people who could definitely put up resistance, organize and head it. Second, domestic and international communications were not broken. Third, a curfew was not imposed. A feeble attempt to impose it was made only on the second day. Fourth, the freedom of movement was not restricted and communications operated as usual. Fifth, the situation in the mass media was not clear: the statements and decisions of the emergency-rule committee were broadcast together with the statements and comments of its opponents. In short, the putschists did not take the elementary steps which determine the essence of the state of emergency. At first, all this looked like some strange political show. It was only some time later, especially after the press conference held by the putschists who did not look self-confident, that the events could be assessed properly. Personally, I would assess them as **an attempt to stage a coup with a limited demonstration of strength.** Otherwise events could take a different turn.

N.T. Suppose you are right, what could happen further?

W.J. I have no doubt that even a "model state of emergency" would sooner or later lead the putschists to an inevitable defeat, but only at a more terrible price.

N.T. It is difficult to imagine that the conspirators did not know how to stage a coup...

W.J. I have no doubt that they knew. I

think their self-confidence ruined them. They believed that the people were timid and law-abiding as before. It would be enough to issue directives and play with arms and the goal would be achieved. Perhaps they also counted on the section of the population (and there are certainly such people) who longed for a strong arm, for public order. They ignored the fact that the sentiments in the army were different, too. The army had gained the necessary independence of political pressure. Today it sees its task in safeguarding the Constitution and serving the nation, not a political party or a grouping. I think from now on it becomes impossible to use the army for political aims. However, the troops may take part in armed ethnic conflicts, but not in the name of someone's aspirations for power and not on a national scale.

N.T. Our magazine has repeatedly carried articles devoted to martial law in Poland. Did you have any associations with what took place in your country ten years ago?

W.J. No, I did not. It was an entirely different stage of history. Poland, just like the Soviet Union, was a different country, and Europe and the world were different, too. An expolosive situation had then ripened in Poland. We were on the brink of civil war with all its terrible consequences. Besides, the East and the West watched closely what was taking place in Poland.

N.T. Intervention from without seemed quite real then, according to the "Brezhnev doctrine" of limited sovereignty.

W.J. Well, there were possibly different ways for the development of events. You did not have such a direct threat on August 19, neither within the country nor outside it. True, the situation in the economy is difficult. However, there was no such strong political opposition as Solidarnosc which could organize a national uprising. Further, the motives for which the state of emergency was declared in our countries seemed to coincide outwardly: it was necessary to abolish the chaos, check the growth of crime and so on. Even our slogans calling for a "persistent implementation of reforms" coincided. The most essential distinction was that in Poland martial law was imposed by the Council of State vested with constitutional powers, a collective body (the presidency did not exist then – **R.B.**) In the Soviet Union, the August 19 action was an anti-constitutional coup attempt.

N.T. Thank you once more for the interview. We shall impatiently wait for the appearance of your book, in which, I hope, you will reveal the details you think inopportune here.

Photos from Time magazine (USA)

Number One object

"America gave Russia a steamship," and Russia gave Angola a mausoleum

The first president of Angola, poet and doctor Agostinho Neto, died at the age of 57 in Moscow in September 1979 on the operating table at a clinic of the 4th department of the USSR Ministry of Public Health. His death fostered many rumours which were supported by well-founded suspicions about the involvement of the Soviet Union in the attempted military coup in Angola in May 1977. Among the putschists there turned out to be a number of people directly connected with the CC CPSU.

Not long before the coup, the leading conspirator, Nito Alvis, headed a delegation of the ruling party – the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) – at the 25th Congress of the CPSU. This was his first and last trip to Moscow. The coup failed, and Moscow made a final decision to rely on President Agostinho Neto.

Nevertheless, during the burial of Neto, in a big Soviet colony in Luanda, security measures were tightened. Machine guns were stationed on the roof of the building where Soviet specialists lived and the residents were given their own weapons. A massacre was feared. The Angolan government in no way dispersed these fears. I remember how a Portuguese bar owner, remaining in the country after the declaration of independence of Angola in 1975, offered me (I worked at the time as an interpreter) to sit out the "troubled times" in the basement of his bar. "The most important thing is not to go running to the embassy. You'll never make it," he assured me.

But that all passed. The new Angolan government decided to embalm the body of Agostinho Neto and lay it in a luxurious mausoleum in the centre of Luanda. Soviet specialists were hired to do the work. Experienced mausoleum builders from Moscow immediately arrived in Angola's capital. This became the most expensive project of Soviet-Angolan cooperation, arms shipments aside, of course.

I accidentally fell into the company of the professional "necrophiles." In spite of the secrecy which surrounded the activities of this group (the regime of its participants was even stricter than that of embassy code clerks), they were in need of an interpreter. I met that need.

First of all, the mausoleum builders met with the widow of the first president of Angola. The first question, that of how she would like to see her peaceful husband in his coffin, put her in a state of shock. But after a little while (and not without suggestions from the top) she issued instructions that the president should lay in the sarcophagus with his glasses on and his arms folded on his chest.

As the time passed, the body of Neto became splotchy and began to lose its black colour. Soviet specialists did not have any experience in embalming Africans, and they found themselves confronted with an insoluble problem. Then, on personal instructions from Leonid Brezhnev, the confidential decision was made to secretly send the body to Moscow for special treatment. The Angolan leaders gave their consent. At the Soviet embassy in Luanda, there were sighs of relief. But these quickly gave way to a sense of alarm. Real panic set in at the embassy when it was reported that a group of Angolan leaders had gone to Moscow, without any preliminary agree-



The Cheops Pyramid. Lenin's Mausoleum. Ho Chiminh 's Tomb

ment, to return the body of Neto to Luanda. As usual, the embassy staff was the last to find out about this, and was waiting with sinking hearts for the reaction from Moscow leadership. Meanwhile the Angolans had landed in Yugoslavia, from where they sent a message to Moscow, and were calmly waiting for a reply. Nobody could understand why they did this. Possibly they wanted once again to demonstrate their independence.

At this time, so as not to alarm veterans and pioneers, not to mention other members of the Angolan and international public, these people were invited to lay flowers at and pay their respects to the closed, empty coffin, which had been put on display in a glass case in one of the halls in the presidential palace.

But the most impressive moment of the whole affair was the start of construction of the mausoleum. The Angolan leadership wanted everything all at once: the mausoleum, crowned with a 100-metre spire; a square for parades and with artificial lighting, which would facilitate colour filming at night; a new administrative centre; and an air-raid shelter to protect them from a direct intercontinental ballistic missile attack. In the event of a nuclear attack on Angola, the coffin of Agostinho Neto would automatically drop from the funeral hall into a special vault.

The mausoleum, with all of its attributes, was finally built. But the problems did not end, instead new ones appeared. For example, what should the guard of honour be wearing? For the temperature in the mausoleum should not exceed 15 degrees. This is cold for Africans. What to do? It was agreed that the guard would wear two pairs of long underwear and wool socks. But there was still another surprise in store for the builders of mausoleum. They received the order to construct a chair for the current president on the platform of the mausoleum. The Soviet specialists proposed a secret design based on the Moscow mausoleum: the president appears to be standing during the ceremony, when, in fact, he is sitting on a special chair. But the Angolans got their way.

In order to construct a dozen administrative buildings, they had to tear down an entire residential area, which included magnificent villas abandoned by the Portuguese when Angola declared its independence. These villas had been seized by Angolans. Now their own government was depriving them of these homes, sending them into the forests and savannahs.

So the city lost its most beautiful corner. Upon completion of the mausoleum, Luanda had become reminiscent of something between abandoned buildings and an urban dust heap. When the preparations for the regular MPLA congress were in progress, the authorities called upon the ambassadors of fraternal socialist countries to help them clean the Luanda streets, as the administration did not want to find itself in an embarrassing position of letting foreign guests see the whole mess. I remember we repaired the city's sewage system, while a team of street cleaners arrived from the GDR.

The residents of the city lived in houses hastily built for them of clay and tin, without plumbing or electricity. But in the centre of Luanda towered the sumptuous mausoleum. The cost of the upkeep of the body of the leader came to about ten million transferable rubles a year. Obviously it was the gratuitous help from the Soviet people. The construction of the mausoleum was estimated at one and a half billion transferable rubles. Government credit had been granted on preferential terms. No one really thought that this debt would be paid...

* * *

Meanwhile the civil war in Angola has ended. Soon there will be elections. Who will come to power in the country? Will it be Agostinho Neto's successors, or his irreconcilable enemies – oppositionists from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola? And what kind of future will there be for the Number One object of Soviet-Angolan cooperation?

Vladimir Kokorev

Taking photos of Agostinho Neto's mausoleum is categorically forbidden

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Oleg and Leila

The Gordievskies could reunite after the former KGB chief had been put on trial...

Lord Nicholas Bethell

The arrival at a London airport a few days ago of Leila Gordievskaya and her two young daughters, thanks to a decision by the new liberal KGB chief Vadim Bakatin, will bring to an end one of the most disagreeable problems in Britain's recent relations with the Soviet Union.

For six years Oleg Gordievsky, former head of the KGB in London and now a naturalised British subject, has been separated from his wife and young daughters – Masha, 12, and Anyuta, 10. It is extraordinary that such a gross violation of human rights has been allowed to last so long in spite of Mr. Gorbachev and his supposed new humanity. Oleg may have been guilty of treason, but Leila and the girls are innocent.

Any ordinary Russian living here in England, with a wife and two daughters held in Moscow, would have aroused great British sympathy and public protest. But this did not happen in the Gordievsky case. He defected in September 1985, but until last year he was "under wraps," sentenced to death and seen only by the secret services and a few close friends. The public campaign began only after five years of separation.

Until last year, when he began to emerge, though always in disguise, for interviews connected with his book, MPs and journalists here were not encouraged by the British authorities to raise the matter of Leila and the girls. The matter was left to the Foreign Office and its "quiet diplomacy," which produced no result and distressed Leila greatly.

Many were reluctant to get involved in something that was an espionage question as well as a human rights question Doughty British human rights compaigners who had rallied to the banner of the Sakharovs, Shcharansky and Orlov as well as supporting the regular trickle of British students trying to extricate the Russian fiancees they had met at Moscow University, showed little interest in helping Oleg and Leila.

"After all, he is a traitor," I was told more than once by British friends who seemed to have forgotten that the Soviet system he betrayed for 12 years was busy torturing dissidents with pain-inducing drugs in KGB psychiatric hospitals, arresting the leaders of non-official trade unions, had imprisoned the poet Irina Ratushinskaya for her "attacks on Soviet history" and was maintaining occupying armies in Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia.

A government that took so little account of its duty to protect its citizens' rights had, I believe, little moral claim on their loyalty. Oleg's quarrel was with the Soviet system, not with Russia. When Russia is fully democratic, he says, he hopes to be able to return. This will depend, though, on what happens with the death sentence passed on him in 1985, which still technically remains in force.

Leila Gordievskaya: from Moscow with love

There was another argument: "He should never have joined the KGB in the first place." Many of the famous Soviet dissidents take this view and now even he would admit, I suppose, that it was an error on his part. But 1962, the year he joined, was a year of hope for Russia's liberals. Solzhenitsyn's *Ivan Denisovich* was published that year in Moscow and it seemed to many men wiser than the 23-year-old recruit Gordievsky that Nikita Khrushchev was leading the country along the democratic path. He joined the organisation in which his father had spent his life and in whose service his elder brother died.

Khrushchev did not, of course, democratize the Soviet Union. The KGB reasserted its inherent brutality. Gordievsky found that; once in the KGB, it is not easy to get out. By 1972 he was in contact with the British and walking the tightrope of life as a double agent. But history has shown, I think, that he made the right choice. The KGB is not an organization that deserves loyalty, even (or perhaps especially) from Russians.

I have found, though, that many in Britain remain embarrassed by the episode and have kept their distance from the whole murky world of espionage, especially the suggestion that Oleg was smuggled out of Russia in a diplomatic car, in violation of the Vienna Convention. The result has always been a certain timidity about any official British effort to recover his wife and daughters.

And yet Oleg has no blood on his hands. The Albanians sent into that country by our secret services during the Cold War and given away to the Hoxha regime by Kim Philby were captured, tortured and executed, as were their families and friends. Some were released only earlier this year, after 30 years of torment. Most of the 600 British agents whom George Blake boasts of denouncing were also shot. Gordievsky was never responsible for anything like this.

He did, it is true, denounce the 31 Soviet agents who were expelled from London in 1985 and banned from NATO posts. "They were deprived of the chance to carry out their chosen profession and their families underwent a terrible upheaval," moaned the KGB in a statement several months ago. But this is an injury of a different scale.

The KGB men who drafted that statement are today, presumably, looking for alternative work and their boss is sitting in one of his own jails. He took a special interest in the Gordievsky case. He was infuriated, it is said, not so much by Oleg's betrayal, but by the lack of professionalism of his colleagues who allowed him to slip through their fingers after they unmasked him in 1985.

Mr Gobachev was unhelpful too, even as late as July 18th, when British Prime Minister John Major raised the case with him, receiving no coherent reply. Kryuchkov is said to have advised Gorbachev, "If the families of traitors are allowed to join them in the West, we will lose our last sanction, our last means of controlling our men in the field." He may be regretting now that he took Kryuchkov's advice, in this as in other matters.

Still, all this is in the past. Leila and the girls spent last night with Oleg for the first time in six years. It is in political terms a small consequence of the Soviet Union's August cataclysm, but one of the happiest.

THE PREVIOUS ARTICLE:

For many socialism became a sacred idea. It was based on the ingenious theory of Marx, but we couldn't put it into practice. The sources of socialism are inequality, a serious illness of human society. Socialism is the seductive desire to quickly and finally solve the problem of inequality. Chernyshevsky's heroine in search of a remedy for inequality puts the unusual question: "How should the profit be divided?"

About the history of the great october socialist catastrophe

3. Robbery or payment

Simon Soloveichik

WHAT IS HAPPENING? NOTHING IS CHANGING. We are still at the very sources of the current social tragedy – in the middle of the last century. The idea of economic equality has just appeared on the horizon of public consciousness and each can notice that the capitalist doesn't do anything, but receives a large profit only because he owns the means of production. That's unfair, and it's the cause of inequality! Why should the capitalist get anything? Why shouldn't the profit be split between everyone?

That would be the triumph of justice.

In Vera Pavlovna's (Chernyshevsky's heroine) workshop the profit is divided in a new way. The famous novel could be called *How to Share the Profit* rather than *What Is to Be Done?* because Vera Pavlovna explains to her seamstresses that "kind and intelligent people have written many books about how we ought to live so that all were happy. And the main thing is that workshops must be run differently."

To run them differently meant to divide up the profit differently and this, as we see, turns out to be the most important. All that has to be done is to find a new way and all will be well in the world.

But Vera Pavlovna's innocent girls didn't know about socialism and so, when asked how to divide the profit they answered according to their usual notion of fairness: the owner gets a third and the rest goes to them. And in real, not literary workshops of those times the owner always was given share "for the risk," as the workers said.

Not knowing it they all reasoned like Fourier, who was a socialist, but not a revolutionary, and therefore thought that profit should be divided as follows: 4/12 (i.e. 1/3) for capital, 3/12 (i.e. 1/4) for talent, 5/12 (i.e. less than half) for all the rest.

But true socialists would not have that. The publicist-democrat Nikolai Shelgunov wrote: "Today's proletariat has dealt with this question in theory in a completely different way having proclaimed that the fruits of our work belong entirely to us."

This is the catch!

This is the critical point where the shift was made towards today's socialism. From this point began the great historical stage which perhaps came to an end only now in August of 1991.

Always, as long as the world has existed,

Антикапиталъ

from when Adam and Eve displeased God, the poor rose up against the rich fighting for better living and working conditions. But that was class trade. Now a class struggle has begun. A fight to the end.

Never before has there existed the notion, later ironically formulated by Gorki that "the one who works is the owner." So never before had the worker claimed "all fruits of his labour" leaving nothing for the owner of the enterprise.

It's amazing how little the world changes! Many years have gone by and still we hear the same question and the same arguments. Today some also say: "That is mine, it's my blood and sweat, why pay the owner? I won't!" And others egg him on, tempt him. "Yes, all is yours! It's your sweat and blood. All the fruits of your labour should be yours!"

And no one kindly explains what's going on, what is fatal about the temptation.

... But what did Vera Pavlovna do when the seamstresses said she should get one third of the profit? How dis she answer them?

She answered very tactfully. Whatever you say, Chernyshevsky was a great man. He possessed an instinct for the truth. He understood that for Vera to refuse the money would be absurd economically. But what about his socialist feelings? He came up with an unique union of absurdity and psychological truth.

THE ECONOMICS OF VERA PAVLOVNA. Of course Vera Pavlovna refused the profit – not only the one third which was to be hers, but any money at all.

But being a writer and kind man, Chernyshevsky made Vera Pavlovna explain her unusual novel deed thus: it turns out that she simply doesn't need the money.

Her husband earns enough.

"If I don't have enough money, I just have to mention it to my husband and he'll give me more," explained Vera Pavlovna simply to the girls.

More power to Vera Pavlovna's husband!

This is the true basis for socialism!

For Vera Pavlovna the workshop was a hobby, a passion, a socialist experiment. She wanted people to live differently, better. But without someone else's money the new life doesn't pan out...

Chernyshevsky's honesty along with his dear heroine pointed out what later all would hide, even from themselves: the new socialist economics needed a rich husband who would pick up the tab. Otherwise it couldn't exist. Money from the side is needed. It was gotten by robbing the peasants, then exploiting the oil profits, and finally by robbing all the people.

From the very beginning the new economics contained elements of deception. It's impossible to run the economy that way. The promise of a good life for all was deceiving, a temptation.

And the seducer was our Vera Pavlovna! There's no other like her in Russian literature. She cheated on economics with her husband and on her husband with his best friend, thus destroying both the family and the economy.

Later she seduced the young Lenin.

But on the whole Chernyshevsky's little cunning shows how weak the socialist idea still was at that time, how unfirm its basis.

A firm foundation had to be laid under the building being erected. And that's what Karl Marx did in his *Capital* where he conclusively, and it seemed forever, justified the right of the worker **to all the fruits of his labour**. What Vera Pavlovna gave up voluntarily, out of love, after Marx was taken by force.

This is the historical significance of his *Capital* and all Marxism.

IS NOTHING SACRED? The reader's heart skips a beat. Now they'll refute Marx's *Capital*. But it is almost 800 pages long! There are products–money–products in it! We passed the exam and have had more than our fill of it! Don't even talk about it!

And what can be refuted there? Everything is clearly proven and millions have studied this book. Even the capitalists acknowledge it and keep a copy on the table. There were many who tried to refute it, but failed. And do those who refuted it, those apologists for capitalism, count? Isn't it shameful to raise one's hand against something sacred? Oh well, so they scold Lenin, but they could at least leave the old bearded man alone. He was for the workers with his whole heart.

...I understand all. I already know how I'll be reproached. But I sigh and again pick up the volume of *Capital* read from cover to cover. Not counting the professors of political economics and graduate students, today I'm probably the only one reading *Capital*. I ran into a friend. He asked: "How are you? What are you up to?"

"I'm reading Marx's *Capital*."

"What? You must have a lot of free time."

"Have you read it?"

"Yeah, 30 years ago before taking post-graduate exams..."

That's the point, all read it 30 years ago and are sure that they know this book. And when they criticize it now it's done with a wave of the hand as if to say it's obsolete now or there was never anything new in it (that's what academician Stanislav Shatalin writes, for instance), or that it's lost its relevance.

Is it the time to be reading *Capital*?

It is precisely the time for it. I wrote this article before the coup and now I can see that is the time to read it. Marxism, which was our ideology for so many years, cannot be flicked away. That's not fair. For inner peace and for honesty's sake we must know whether Marxism was a lie or the truth. Our fate, as before, is hidden in *Capital*. The secret of socialism is in it. And the answer to the question about the sacred teaching having a grain of truth in it depends on how you understand this work. Is it all a bluff like Vera Pavlovna's worshop?

You may say that I'm not an economist. Well, the readers are not all economists either. But remember the answer of Pushkin's Varlaam in *Boris Godunov*? When they began to read the award in the inn it sounded as if Varlaam ought to be caught and hung. He grabbed the paper and said: "I haven't read anything for a long time and don't understand well, but if it's a matter of being hung or not, I'll make it out."

And we are about to be hung – we're threatened with starvation. I'm not to blame that the economists and philosophers either are silent or speak out unconvincingly. We'll have to dig into *Capital* ourselves.

THE TWO MAIN IDEAS. There are two main ideas in this four-volume work and all usually concentrate on the first of them: the capitalist robs the workers, takes their unpaid labour, exploits them. It is thought that Marx revealed the secret of capitalist exploitation. But, even without Marx, what worker hasn't felt himself how he is being cheated. The theory of exploitation, by the way, has been disputed more than once. Mostly it is of theoretical (for justifying socialism) and emotional (for arousing anger) significance.

But this isn't the most dangerous idea in *Capital*. The second idea, which the reader usually misses, is much more important.

In 800 pages Marx convinces us that the capitalist appropriates the product of unpaid labour, and students try hard to absorb the cleverly woven proof of this. Only two pages are devoted to the second thought in this work. But mainly using the idea on those two pages socialism was built for

some 70 years and a totalitarian regime disguised. In them there is tragedy, and from them blood.

Further on in their *Collected Works* Marx and Engels plunge into an argument about how to divide the profit.

Should the capitalist get the money or, like Vera Pavlovna, take nothing?

In other words, is a capitalist owner needed or can we do without this loafer and exploiter and drive him out?

THE CAPITALIST RAISES HIS HACKLES. And so the worker and the capitalist argue about their contribution to the value of a product and how much pay each deserves.

First of all "our friend" (that's what Marx called the capitalist) shyly points out that he could have squandered his money, but instead of that "I consumed it productively and made yarn with it." Shouldn't he be rewarded for his honesty?

The worker answers: don't pose as a collection of treasures, you are now in possession of "good yarn instead of a bad conscience."

But the capitalist now gets obstinate: "Can the labourer merely with his arms and logs produce commodities out of nothing? Did I not supply him with the materials, by means of which, and in which alone, his labour could be embodied?" And wasn't it he who did society an incalculable service. Wasn't it he who made it possible for the worker to make a living?

The worker answers him that for his investment he was well rewarded: he payed the worker 3 shillings and the worker "gave him value for value." The rest was the surplus value, i.e., unpaid labour. The capitalist couldn't ask for any more. And for the service the owner gets an even stronger answer. They cite the words of Luther that the "adulteress and adulterer do one another a great service and pleasure."

How do you like that?

Now just wait a minute! The capitalist asks a third question: "Have I myself not worked? Have I not performed the labour of superintendence and of overlooking the spinner? And does not this labour, too, create value?"

In answer the capitalist's manager and foreman shrug their shoulders – it wasn't he who worked so much but they. Why should he be paid?

Stop! We're on the edge of the precipice.

SUBSTITUTION. In this answer which seems so just at first glance is the unnoticeable substitution of one thing for another. The substitution on which the whole conception of *Capital* hinges.

The arguments about whether the capitalist works or not as a manager goes on to this day. For example very recently a very respected man said: "When will they stop taking out of moth balls that outdated conviction that the manager, entrepreneur (what we used to call a capitalist, damn it) doesn't work? Sometimes he works day and night..." (*The Literaturnaya Gazeta*)

The manager, entrepreneur, as we see, are divided by a comma. It may be the trickiest comma in the history of mankind. It unites two different professions, two very different functions.

Soviet rule held out so long on this very confusion. Look, they shouted in all the newspapers, the workers themselves can run the factories! Look, they manage fine without the former owners! Socialist press the world over wrote about this wonderful phenomen justifying the revolution, and at the same time all its horrors. It seemed that a new era had really set in: the workers were managing without the capitalists.

The trick to all this is that the workers can manage a factory if it is soon headed by someone or a manager hired. There are many more people able to manage than are enterprising. It's not accidental that far from every manager started the business. A manager and an entrepreneur have different abilities. For the manager most important is an ability to get along with people and make them do what he wants. The capitalist must have a passion for profit, a love of risk and intuition, which in the long run, makes the difference between success and failure. The manager and entrepreneur are different people, they are necessary to the economy in different ways. And they cannot replace one another (though sometimes one person performs both these functions).

But Marx didn't go into this. He strongly objected to those who affirmed that the capitalist serves as the manager because it is necessary for the enterprise. In the third volume of *Capital* he calls such people vulgar economists, apologists for the bourgeoisie "representing profit not as a surplus value, derived from unpaid labour, but as the capitalist's wages for work performed by him."

But Marx insists the capitalist doesn't work and therefore doesn't deserve any pay. "Cooperative factories furnish proof that the capitalist has become no less redundant as a functionary in production as he himself, looking down from his high perch, finds the big landowner redundant." And "...the capitalist disappears as superfluous from the production process."

This is the main conclusion of *Capital*. There is the true discovery of Karl Marx: the capitalist disappears from the production process because he isn't needed. He is superfluous. This is the very heart of Marx's theory. All the rest – the foundation and superstructure, the vanguard role of the proletariat, the labourer will rule the world, "the owner is he who works," no more parasites, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the building of socialism, terror – all came from this very conclusion.

The superfluous person should and must be driven out of production. We'll drive him out and a new era in world history will begin. Property will be transferred to the hands of those who work. The proletarian revolution was needed for this and no other reason.

But what is this main conclusion based on? Is it proved convincingly?

Marx reveals that the capitalist doesn't function as a manager. That's true. But on this basis he refuses him the right to existence at all. Having arbitrarily replaced the capitalist with a manager, he goes on to kill him.

But maybe the capitalist carries out some other functions?

Marx doesn't examine them.

The capitalist, as we saw, put forward a number of arguments in his defence, but all are refuted.

But maybe there are other arguments, and maybe there are questions that weren't asked. Marx doesn't ask them and it's clear why: he couldn't answer them. His theory would have fallen apart before our very eyes.

It all comes down to the following: if the capitalist doesn't work he is an exploiter, Marx was right, Marxism is the only true theory and now the advocates of socialism are telling the truth and really defend the workers.

But if the capitalist works it means he receives his fair share, Marx is wrong, Marxist theory doesn't hold and the defenders of the sacred idea of socialism either are deceived or are deceiving the people.

We won't speak about how big a share the capitalist gets. Marx puts the question as a matter of principle: not a penny to the parasite. Why pay him, and in foreign currency at that?

So does the capitalist not performing the function of manager work or not?

Our man in Kabul

Between Amin and Karmal

The real reasons for the split within the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in 1966 remained unknown to both the International Affairs Department (IAD) of the CPSU Central Committee and experts on Afghan affairs in the KGB intelligence and in the Soviet military intelligence until as late as September 1979 (!). In 1966, the PDPA split into two feuding factions: Khalq ("people") led by Nur Mohammad Taraki and his lieutenant Hafizullah Amin, and Parcham ("banner") headed by Babrak Karmal.

Babrak Karmal played at least as important a role in the creation of the PDPA as Taraki and offered a significantly more realistic programme than the latter. But Amin in every way downplayed Karmal's role and services. Moscow was made to understand that the split in the PDPA had come about because of Karmal's personal ambitions and had actually been caused by the struggle for power between him and Taraki. That version was credited right away. Moscow didn't even bother to hear both sides. And when Parcham volunteered an explanation, they were simply ignored. That was a mistake which cost everyone dearly.

CPSU Central Committee is not a post office

Khalq spread its own version of the PDPA's history and explanation of the split through communist publications in Beirut, Delhi, Baghdad and Belgrade in mid-1976. Khalq accused Karmal of alleged collaboration with the administration of Afghanistan's former king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, of Maoist leanings in ideology, and even of maintaining contacts with the CIA.

Parcham leaders decided to counter by publishing information designed to dismiss Khalq's allegations. Since they had no direct contacts with Communist parties in other countries, they asked the CPSU Central Committee IAD, via the USSR embassy in Kabul, to send their own version to about 30 "fraternal" parties in Europe and Asia. But Moscow's answer to the request was negative: the ambassador should know that the CPSU CC IAD is not a post office. Inform Karmal that he'd better find his own channels through which to dispatch his correspondence.

Moscow showed no interest in the content of Babrak's message, which remained at the embassy unclaimed. The embassy itself ignored Babrak's message, as did the KGB officer who had been given it at a secret meeting with Karmal. The document just lay abandoned in a stack of back issues of local newspapers for two years until, as chance would have it, I laid my eyes on it.

The document treats, point by point, the main differences between Khalq and Parcham, which led to the split. Here's an outline of the contents of the letter as my memory holds it:

1. Khalqists were building a cult of their leader, Taraki. Parchamists were against



The great leader" Taraki speaking of the "great revolution" which started a great bloodshed

Colonel Alexander MOROZOV, retired. In 1975-79 was KGB deputy chief in Afghanistan. He saw the incompetence of Moscow advisors and CC CPSU blunders that resulted in the Soviet invasion

any cult in the party.

2. Khalqists believed that there were only two social classes which could become reliable allies of the revolutionaries in Afghanistan: workers and farmers. Parchamists thought that the chief allies were the national-patriotic forces represented by working intellectuals, students and an insignificant number of workers.

3. Khalqists declared an irreconcilable war on the clergy, whom they deemed to be the main reactionary force. Parchamists thought that in Afghanistan it wouldn't do to openly oppose the clergy. On the contrary, it would be highly advisable to seek compromised agreement with them.

4. In the opinion of the Khalqists, "dictatorship of the proletariat" must be introduced as a priority, right from the onset of the revolution. But Parchamists associated the initial stage of the revolution only with democratic changes.

After seizing power in 1978 and shouldering Parcham out of power, Khalq embarked on the realization of each aspect of their programme and consequently turned the majority of the country's population into their enemies.

I managed to inform the KGB centre and through it the CPSU Central Committee about the factual causes of the rift in the PDPA only in September 1979, when Victor Osadchy, who controlled the KGB network in Afghanistan, was away on vacation. The numerous information items that I dispatched to Moscow contained my own assessments and conclusions which differed considerably from the opinions shared by Ambassador Puzanov, CPSU and military advisers, and even the KGB emissary Bogdanov.

But why did those people have so much faith in Amin? I think that they felt a certain kinship with Amin, whose motives were quite understandable and whose actions were familiar to them.

Amin was forging ahead with Taraki's cult and never missed an opportunity to style himself a true disciple of that "great leader," too.



Amin drew on Stalin's *Concise History.* He was a past master of intrigue



Like Amin, Karmal supplied information to the KGB which did not at first trust him very much

"An unprecedented amount of creative work was done in the party under the direct guidance of Comrade Nur Muhammad Taraki, General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee," says a booklet about the PDPA, written by Amin. "Comrade Hafizullah Amin, one of the most faithful followers of the great leader, made an enormous contribution to the work directed at boosting the Party's prestige and strengthening its positions."

In his speeches Amin extensively quoted Stalin's *Concise History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks),* the only "truly Marxist" work which became a desk book for him. Rhetoric from the *Concise History* proved sufficient to muddle the heads of the ambassador and CPSU and military advisers, who mistook Amin and Taraki for two "outstanding Marxists." General Boris Ivanov of the KGB correctly sensed the source of Amin's inspiration and once even confided to him: "I'm also a Stalinist like yourself, Comrade Amin."

A coup which surprised the KGB

The PDPA's official version of the April 1978 revolution names Amin as the event's chief inspirator and organizer. Apparently Amin did inform the party's leader, Taraki, that Khalqists among the army officers were ready to stage an armed uprising. Taraki agreed that in the given situation the party could seize power as easily as it had been done by Mohammad Daud in 1973, when the latter overthrew the king with the help of only one armoured regiment.

The KGB agents in Kabul received information concerning Khalq's intentions and passed it to Moscow. Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of KGB intelligence, informed the CPSU Central Committee. He suggested the following plan: the KGB man in Kakbul meets with Taraki and tells him that Moscow would object to an armed confrontation which, according to Kryuchkov and his aides, could constitute a disaster for the PDPA as well as all other progressively-minded forces in Afghanistan. The CPSU Central Committee endorsed the plan.

An emergency meeting with Taraki took place at the villa of a TASS Soviet news agency official in Kabul. Taraki was told the following: We have learned that some members and supporters of the Khalq faction of the PDPA are rather radically disposed and irresponsibly call for an uprising against the regime of President Daud. The CPSU Central Committee believes that this would not only destabilize the situation in Afghanistan but would also be fraught with dire consequences for the PDPA and all other left-wing forces in the country. Therefore we advise Comrade Taraki to exert his influence on these extremists if he knows any and ensure that no such faux pas is made which could harm the PDPA and the world's communist movement at large.

Taraki took this "dressing down" rather calmly and didn't say a word about the plans for an armed coup. When asked who was responsible for Khalq's work within Afghanistan's army, Taraki pointed to "Comrade Amin, my devoted friend and faithful disciple," and even suggested a meeting with the latter.

The KGB men enthusiastically agreed. Soon the KGB began – with every precaution – to see Amin regularly at the TASS villa.

During those secret meetings, Amin told the KGB about Khalq members in the army and brought lists containing all in all about 300 names of servicemen. We didn't have means to verify this information.

The "gret leader" Taraki was arrested by Daud's secret police the night of April 25, 1978, thus providing an excuse for starting a revolution. Among those arrested were many other members of the by then united PDPA Central Committee, including Babrak Karmal. However, for some reason Amin wasn't sent to prison immediately but only after being kept for a few hours under house arrest. That proved to be enough time for him to bring together his comrades in the party and liaison officers and order an armed uprising early on the morning of April 27.

Strangely enough, both Daud and his Minister of the Interior, Qadeer Nouristani, were in the dark about Amin's true role in the party, despite the fact that Amin had gained notoriety as an extremist. Had Amin been thrown into jail right after Taraki and the others, there might not have been any April revolution at all.

A few months later the KGB men in Afghanistan learned that Amin's instructions about the uprising included a severe ban on letting Russians know about the planned action. Did he fear that we would interfere? One of the plotters more loyal to the CPSU and the USSR than to Amin divulged this secret to us. Daud could have been warned, but neither the Soviet Embassy in Kabul nor Moscow could even consider betraying the PDPA.

Though the coup d'etat was staged by Amin's men in the army, Parcham's military organization headed by Mir Akbar Khybar, also helped. Incidentally, the KGB knew almost nothing about Khybar's organization. Afterwards, Amin gave the following description of the events of the night of April 26:

"After the revolutionary uprising was announced to the servicemen of the armoured corps, Khalqists started neutralizing anti-revolutionary forces. For example, an order from the commander of the 15th Armoured Corps, M. Yousuf to start preparations for actions against Khalqists was never carried out."

Afghans are learning how to live in the Soviet way: "advanced" technology and Lenin subbotniks

In fact, M. Yousuf was a Parchamist and, like other Parchamists in the army, wasn't informed by Amin about the move against Daud. That was done on purpose. Yousuf could very well order a move against the mutineers in mistaken belief that it was an attempt by the right-wing forces. Amin omits the fact that after he got his bearings in the situation, Yousuf ordered his men to support the revolution.

Yousuf was arrested and murdered by Amin's secret police a few months later. However, Amin framed that murder as a suicide of a traitor, for whom the awareness of his own betrayal had proved too much. About 90 army officers siding with Parcham landed behind bars.

Here's how Amin describes the murder of Daud and his family:

"As night fell, heroic Khalq-supporting pilots flew their fighter planes to launch an attack on Daud's palace, which forced men and officers defending it to surrender. However, Daud and his relatives and servants continued fiercely to resist.

"Rumours were spread at the palace that Daud was to be taken alive. But when a commando squad led by a Khalqist officer made its way into the palace and Comrade Imamuddin demanded Daud's surrender, explaining that the politigal power in the country was in the hands of the PDPA, Daud drew a pistol and shot Imamuddin, wounding him.

"After that Khalqist soldiers opened fire and killed Daud and his entourage."

Still there are reasons to believe that Khalqists assaulting the palace had Amin's order to kill Daud and his retinue on the spot, in case the revolution won. That decision was prompted by the sad experience of the short-lived Sudanese revolution when Communists kept President Nimeiri alive and later were severely dealt with by the President who regained power in the country with outside support.

During the next few days, Khalqists hunted down Daud's close as well as remote relatives arresting and killing them. Thus, they executed Afghanistan's former military attaché in Moscow, General Suleyman Rokay, who had been decorated with the Soviet Order of Friendship Between Peoples, as well as his son who received medical training in Leningrad and was working at Kabul's hospital.

"We have power, but we don't know what to do with it"

Amin skilfully influenced the opinions of the Soviet Ambassador and numerous Soviet advisors who were flown to Afghanistan on his and Taraki's requests, worded as follows: "We have power but we don't

know what to do with it. Please dispatch here as many advisors as possible for our armed forces, the PDPA, and each of our ministries. Teach us to manage the state, and we will do everything as we are taught." The first batch of CPSU advisors headed by Nikolai Simonenko (who was responsible for the Afghanistan sector of the CPSU Central Committee IAD) arrived in Kabul in mid-May.

Amin isolated the advisors from the PDPA's chief ideologist, Babrak Karmal, and quickly indoctrinated Simonenko, turning him into a supporter of the Khalq faction. It was enough for Amin to declare in Simonenko's presence his "sincere admiration" for the CPSU and Leonid Brezhnev, a "true Leninist," on several occasions, and that did it.

By that time, differences within the PDPA became quite obvious. We wanted to prevent escalation of the factional struggle into a more serious conflict. On my suggestion, Osadchy convinced the ambassador and Simonenko to throw a reception at the embassy to honour the group of advisors arriving in Kabul and invite equal number of Khalqists and Parchamists, all members of the joint PDPA Central Committee. The reception was held May 18 and the atmosphere there was cordial, with no manifestation of friction between the two factions.

But on the following day we learned that Amin (who was not among the guests) summoned Noor Ahmad Noor, one of Parcham's leaders, and kicked up a row which nearly ended in a fight. Amin demanded that all the Central Committee members henceforth accept such invitations only with his personal permission.

Simonenko had a serious talk with Amin, who afterwards gave him some document entitled "Preliminary proposals concerning changes in the organizational structure of the PDPA, necessitated by the victory of the April 1978 revolution." Simonenko mistrusted the ambassador's translators and asked for a translation from the KGB chief.

The translation was done and typed for Simonenko. It was never registered or classified. I managed to get hold of one copy. Here's a quotation from a section entitled "Differences between Khalq and Parcham":

"Khalqist comrades were imbued with the spirit of class struggle against the suppressing regimes of Zakhir Shah and Daud.

"Parchamist comrades adopted the spirit of reconciliation with the upper crust which ruled the country before the Revolution.

"Khalqist comrades are profoundly devoted to everything associated with the Soveit Union. They even put the CPSU above their own party. Therefore, Comrade Taraki wants to benefit from the experience of the CPSU regarded as a treasure which can be drawn on by the leaders of the PDPA.

"...Parchamist comrades are also Communists devoted to the CPSU... But they believe the opinion of their own party leaders comes first and the opinion of the CPSU comes second.

"Parchamist comrades are notorious for their participation in the work of the Daud administration.

"Khalqist comrades were not known to collaborate with the Daud administration.

"Khalqist comrades have always been close to the poor.

"Parchamist comrades were close to wealthier people."

Amin presumed that Simonenko didn't know much, and tried to compromise Parcham in Simonenko's eyes. He put forward a programme of removing Parcham from power which the two factions shared in post-revolutionary Afghnistan. But Amin was not aware that the Soveit intelligence knew about Parcham's participation in the Daud administration which had been sanctioned by Soviet intelligence. Almost all Parchamists mentioned in Amin's document as members of Daud's Central Committee of the Republic shared information with Soviet secret agencies.

Osadchy and I agreed that he would explain to Simonenko the real purport of Amin's document and show him the inconsistency of Amin's accusations against Karmal and his associates. We were perfectly aware that to advise CPSU Central Committee people and otherwise intrude into their business was at that time forbidden to anyone.

Simonenko attentively listened to what Osadchy had to say and pointed out that he himself had a poor opinion of that document. He also claimed that he himself was of the opinion that Amin had to be stopped, or else the PDPA would have another split. He promised to answer Amin in a letter, the contents of which had to be cleared with Moscow. Later he showed Osadchy a copy of his answer to Amin cleared by the CPSU Central Committee IAD.

"Speaking about the need to restructure the PDPA, necessitated by the latter's transformation into the country's ruling party after the victory of the April 27, 1978, revolution it is important to keep in mind... that Vladimir Lenin emphasized on many occasions that a revolution could be worth anything only if it knew how to protect itself. The experience gained by the CPSU in its struggle to protect the gains of the Great October Revolution and to construct the material and technological base for communism, as well as experience of Communist and workers' parties in countries of people's democracy and countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which opted for a non-capitalist way of national development, particularly those countries which had the ambition to build socialist societies, show that internal reaction and external imperialist forces do everything they can to restore the old regime and regain the commanding positions they have lost. In this sense, Afghanistan is not likely to be an exception. Therefore the PDPA faces the historic task of protecting the April 1978 revolution and building a new and socialist Afghanistan. This great mission can be fulfilled only if the PDPA acts as a united and closely-knit political organization held together by one will and a common goal."

That was all the CPSU Central Committee IAD did to prevent another rift tearing apart the PDPA. Could that kind of answer stop Amin who began his macabre ascent to the peak of power in the party and the state? The first stage of that ascent was marked by routing Parcham.

(To be continued)

FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

The issue of the "end of ideology" would seem sufficiently novel. In his day, back in the 1960s, the US sociologist Daniel Bell introduced this notion into the politico-ideological vocabulary that was employed when debating the "notorious theory of convergence," the consequences of the scientific and technological revolution, the role of the intellectual in modern society, and, of course, the confrontation between the two "superpowers." Involved in these debates were virtually all politico-ideological trends, with only extremists, notably the extreme rightists and the extreme leftists, inclusive primarily of the communists arrogantly holding aloof. Within the framework of the society of "real socialism," economics and politics were again sacrificed on the altar of ideology. Frost struck anew after the certain thaw, now for long.

Yet if we bother to rummage amidst the "never burning manuscripts," we shall discover the initiators of the "end-of-ideology" debate even here, furthermore at the very start of this 20th century. As we see, our country was not without its prophets.

The writers firstly coming to mind are the contributors to the celebrated *Vekhi* (Landmarks) journal, whom we have already introduced to our reader. They had their own special way of raising the problem of ideology and the intellectual along with the latter's role in society and politics. True, they interpreted the very concept of the intellectual, or rather should we say of the intelligentsia, in a very specific manner, more as a state of mind, as one "contaminated" by ideological symbols, bearing the imprint of moribund myths on the social activities of socially active strata. The specific use to which this notion was put resulted in the attitudes of the *Vekhi* contributors not being understood by intellectuals to whom they had primarily addressed themselves. Then the sharpness with which they raised the issue was also instrumental.

The *Vekhi* writers provoked much opposition, more specifically voiced in the *Intelligentsia in Russia* anthology brought out in St. Petersburg in 1910. The cudgels were taken by the "slighted intellectuals" from among the top men in the Constitutional Democrats party, especially P. Milyukov, whose voice was the sharpest. Yet included were also several quite neutral contributions reaffirming rather the rightness of *Vekhi*'s authors than their sins. They noted the different interpretations placed on various concepts and notions, rather than the differences of principle.

Notable in that respect is the contribution from Academician Dmitry Ovsyaniko-Kulikovsky. This professor of the Universities of Kharkov and Moscow, an eminent culturologist and extremely erudite scholar, schooled at the top universities of St. Petersburg and Moscow, and also of Prague and Paris, entitled his essay the *Psychology of the Russian Intelligentsia.* As he for long had been preoccupied with the psychology of creativity and the comparative study of mythological systems, he combined this with an analysis of the history of Russian culture and as a result, sought to comprehend the social conflicts afflicting his contemporary Russia. In the aforementioned essay, excerpts from which follow, he concludes that the "end of ideology" in Russia is near.

The end of ideology

Dmitry Ovsyaniko-Kulikovsky (1853-1920)

I understand the term "intelligentsia" in its broadest and most definite sense as all of educated society, incorporating everyone who in one or another way, directly or indirectly, actively or passively is involved in the country's intellectual labours.

The intelligentsia are a thinking stratum developing intellectual boons known as "spiritual values." These are numerous and varied and we classify them under such headings as science, philosophy, art, ethics, etc. By nature these blessings or values have no objective existence outside the human psyche: indeed, science, philosophy, art, ethics, etc. do not exist as something external. All that we have is the scientific, philosophical, artistic and moral activity of individuals and groups. Hence of a very special significance here is the issue of the person's subjective attitude to one or another area of intellectual activity. To analyze the psychology of the thinking man as representative of the intelligentsia in a given country at a given time, it is not enough to indicate that he is involved in one or another type of intellectual activity, is preoccupied with one or another scientific or philosophical issue, that he keeps track of achievements in these fields, etc. We must yet elucidate what he seeks by this occupation, what he appreciates in science or philosophy, and what role they play in his own spiritual life. In short, the question is one of the thinking man's psychological attitude to this or that intellectual activity in which he is involved in one way or another, it making no difference whether he is professional or amateur, or simply an educated person keeping track of the achievements that the human intellect has scored in different domains.

These attitudes greatly vary... Indeed, it would be hard to find a person with such versatile gifts enabling his psyche to encompass every aspect and accept all spiritual blessings without curtailing them. More often than not people may assimilate in full only some of these spiritual boons, meanwhile adapting the rest in one way or another to the needs and requirements of their own inner world.

In countries where spiritual culture is long entrenched, where the intelligentsia are by no means a novel phenomenon, who have experienced a long road of development, and where in different domains intellectual activity has generated a certain discipline of thinking, we will fail to discover any sharply delineated difference between the two indicated categories. There the first category reduces primarily to the creation of spiritual blessings, with the second comprising that form of their acceptance which we find it most appropriate to designate by the term of "receptivity" as is used in jurisprudence: the spiritual blessing in question is simply accepted by anyone capable of receiving it and that is done with relative ease and without any noticeable adaptation, curtailment or reappraisal, simply due to the assimilated and inherited educated level of thinking, to its refinement and receptivity.

The shoe is on the other foot in backward countries, where spiritual culture is novel. There the second category not only prevails over the first one, but within it there emerge from the mass of possible options and acquire special currency and significance those to whom the term of "receptivity" cannot be applied, those undertaking an intensive search for ideas, what may be qualified as the "evolution of a world outlook." In this case people do not accept spiritual blessings and thereby expand the range of their spiritual interests or the volume of their thinking process, but select what appears to accord with their spiritual requirements.

They seek the synthesis of knowledge, ideas and ethical, if not also often religious, aspirations. They seek to solve all issues, even those insoluble which the greatest of minds have laboured in vain to resolve. It is within the context of these searchings that they work out a so-called "ideology," with every spiritual blessing qualified not in accordance with its substance, but in line with the character and trend of the ideology in question.

The intelligentsia in all countries have gone through this phase. The intellectual ideologue type was familiar everywhere as a generally human type, who was most widespread during certain epochs. However, today he is comparatively rare in Europe's more advanced countries and does not play much of a role. In our country, though, the matter appears in a quite different light.

From the 18th century up till the present, Russia's intelligentsia has been going through the ideological phase. Now, do not take this to mean that all Russian intellectuals without exception were or are of this ideological type. At different times before and now, there have been intellectuals who dispensed with ideological searchings. Quite likely they were not that few, and are today increasing in number. However, they always comprise the minority, moreover one exerting but little influence. Most intellectuals have been of the ideological type.

In the case of nations whose real social and cultural development is cramped, nationalism always adopts prevalent ideological forms

Ideology is a person's world outlook and system of convictions. Yet not every world outlook and not every system of convictions comprises an ideology. The difference depends on the person's psychological attitude to his ideas, concepts and convictions. Though the difference strikes the eye, it is not that easy to elucidate its psychological fundamentals or furnish an exhaustive definition. In the meantime I have indicated but one feature, the type of the person's psychologically religious attitude to his views and convictions as the salient, most distinctive token of the ideological nature. We cannot call this feature fanaticism, as in the first place, not every fanatic is an ideologue, and in the second place, as I have sought to explain, the ideologue need not necessarily be a fanatic in the same way as there are profoundly devout persons who by no means display religious fanaticism.

Let us address ourselves, believe it or not, to Chatsky. (The central character in the noted Russian dramatist Alexander Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe.* – **Tr.**) This man experiences a "million torments," but fails to notice the illusions to which he involuntarily succumbs. He places his concepts in opposition to those of his milieu, argues and preaches his ideas to Famusov and Skalozub in the belief that in conflict here are two world outlooks, new and old, and that it might be possible by means of the "fervent word of persuasion" to get the backward and the benighted to take to the "road of truth." We are all inclined to think likewise, oblivious of the fact that there is no conflict between two world outlooks here at all, because if Chatsky does have a world outlook and a system of convictions, Famusov, Skalozub and Molchalin do not have any world outlook at all. As a result, Chatsky's notions clash not with the ideas of the Famusovs and Skalozubs, but with their ingrained traditional psychological customs which no "fervent word of persuasion" will shatter and in the struggle against which education is powerless, while the mores remain unchanged. Later, Russia produced time and again highly educated Famusovs and most enlightened Skalozubs, let alone numerous university-trained Molchalins. Chatsky, with his progressive ideas stands on a different plane than that of this entire milieu with its backward concepts. What the ideas clash with here is not with other ideas, but with a way of life. It is this fatal historically conditioned conflict between progressive ideas and backward mores that creates the medium nurturing ideologies. In this context every humane, convinced person, zealot or not, necessarily becomes an ideologue.

This point is confirmed by people who by virtue of their intellect and character would not at all seem summoned to engage in ideological activity, in the evolution of an integrated system of views, in the preaching of ideas. When their ideas conflict with mores, they willy-nilly posture as ideologues, thus contributing to the development of ideologies or at least facilitating, even be it passively and unwillingly, the entrenchment of the tradition of the intelligentsia's ideological attitude to reality. Such is Chatsky's contemporary, namely, Onegin, a widely current type of progressive of the 1820s, however one devoid of Chatsky's passion, a type with a "cooled mind bubbling in vapid activity..."

...One feature characteristic to a greater or lesser degree of all ideologies is that the philosophical or theoretical aspect is of no universal significance, as is of genuine philosophical systems, whereas the practical or applied aspect, which is so closely interwoven with the philosophical aspect, acquires no real force of practice, in the sense of the social or political activity of a party. At best we have something akin to a sect.

The ideologue is always too much of a philosopher to be practical and too much of a moralist, publicist and actor in life to be a real philosopher. With him philosophical and scholarly values are adapted to ethical and practical requirements, which in turn, by acquiring a peculiar philosophical context, scare away all who having these self-same requirements cannot accept this philosophy. The ideologies, if more or less well evolved, appeal like religious faiths to those predisposed towards them by virtue of their spiritual makeup and it is among such that they recruit adepts and gain currency...

In the history of the development of our ideologies this period could be termed "prehistoric." For the real history of our ideologies begins only in the 1840s, when there emerged in Russian ideological and social thought the two basic trends of Slavophilism and Westernism. They were our first expressions of intellectual creativity acquiring a social and even, as regards the likelihood of subsequent impact, political significance, and in that sense may be styled "parties." However, what immediately strikes the eye, what may confuse the onlooker is that these hostile "parties" that appear to be quite implacable enemies, dovetailed on all essential aspects in their practical aspirations; they both craved to liberate peasants, limit bureaucratic tutelage, broaden popular education and instal the freedoms of conscience and the press. In that sense these two parties merged and for the time being there was no reason for controversy and enmity. Nonetheless their entire history over the 1840s and partly of the 1850s was one of never ending controversy and incessant enmity. The causes of this discord are not to be found in their general philosophical prerequisites, insofar as both borrowed from one and the same source, notably German idealist philosophy and most Westerners and Slavophiles were disciples of Hegel. Their discord was due to their different understanding of Russian history, of the specific national features of the Russian people, and of its future calling. The Westerners were as much patriots, even nationalists, as the Slavophiles (suffice it to recall Belinsky and Herzen); however, they did not idealize Muscovite Russia as the Slavophiles did but, on the contrary, eulogized Peter the Great, whom the Slavophiles detested, and, finally, differed with them in matters of religion and faith.

These two "parties," that dovetailed in their practical demands as they sought the same objectives, confronted in a constant state of militancy, like two sects, that while believing in the same God, differently interpret the known dicta and abide by different rituals.

The two ideologies evolved within the celebrated Moscow groups that were isolated from the rest of Russia by a kind of

"Great Wall of China." Within each there was much lively intellectual activity and remarkable brainwork; indeed, nothing human was alien to them, their intellectual and ethical interests were broad and varied as they thought and felt for all of Russia. They were the select, who had waken up amidst the universal lethargy and who amidst the sweeping intellectual darkness and ethical myopia had gained sight and sought the light of knowledge and the ideal. Nearly all were enthusiastic idealists, with emotionally highly charged sentimental psyches and responsive minds with sensitive range of lofty, aesthetic, ethical and religious feeling. They were familiar with both civic sadness and Weltschmerz. Herzen's diaries and Belinsky's correspondence more truthfully and fully reflect this richness of spiritual life than the literature of the time. One needs but recall the individual features, minds and characters of those persons, whose activity in this field was conspicuous for its particular creative power...

That comprised a grand gain for culture. In the 1840s, Russia – and Western Europe for that matter – were still far removed from that stage of development. At the time the needs of enlightenment, the requirements of humaneness, and the ideas of liberation were so feeble that they unquestionably stood in want of, if not religious, then at least philosophical blessing...This sanction or the illusion of this sanction was secured by creating ideologies...

The psychology of the Russian intelligentsia evolved through the acquired habit of ideological searching...

Darwin, Comte and Marx were adopted not for reason of their substance, but from the ideological plane as applicable to the spiritual requirements of the Russian intellectual who sought his own world outlook and an explanation for the meaning of his life... The relevant controversies were as similar as in the groups of the 1840s. Though themes, ideas and names had changed, unswervingly carried forward was the tradition of ideological controversy. These all-Russian controversies offered grateful material for parody and caricature. However, it would be an unpardonable error to overlook their positive aspect and, to be frank, their creative significance. One may demonstrate with documented accuracy that it was these controversies that forged our ideologies and trends...

It may be boldly stated that our ideologies, especially the more significant and influential among them, were not the product of the creative genius or talent of one man, who thereby attracted the "mob." Rather did they spring from within the very womb of intellectual life. What faces us is not a "mob" but psychologically organized intellectuals, a thinking milieu demonstrating intensive intellectual and moral activity. This was the medium that reared our ideologues, who drew from it their points of departure, material for their ideas and generally all the intellectual and moral requisites for their individual creativity. Their ideological constructions returned to it to thereby stimulate further collective creativity.

However, it does not at all follow from what I have just said that with us every intellectual is bound to be an ideologue. By virtue of inevitable differentiation, the intelligentsia split back in the 1820s and 1830s already, with one half directly and actively involved in fathering and developing of ideologies, and the other half, either holding aloof from the intellectual movement or involved but accidentally and provisionally in ideological activity... That was a natural necessary "selection," a natural division of labour. In the upshot, the many involved in the ideological controversies in their youth (for every young man is an inborn ideologue, up to a certain age, which varies for different characters) soon fell by the wayside aware that they were not suited to ideological creativity such creativity becoming the task of the "called."

Earlier, I mentioned in passing that ideological moods and searchings are characteristic of youth. One is bound to say the same about a young society, meaning more specifically one that has no tradition of intellectual development; for it intellectual interests, ideas and ideals are novel and alien; this society borrows them going through an imitative phase of development. Finding it hard to make its way through the maze of educational and ideological material pouring in from abroad, it borrows ready-made stereotypes and systems of ideas, assimilating them ideologically as a teaching, a doctrine that needs be taken for granted. Such was the manner in which "Voltairianism" and "Freemasonry" were assimilated in the 18th century. These were ideologies that already cannot be called independent and underivative; shall we rather term them half-baked, as is the case with clumsily produced copy of an alien model.

An ideological attitude to all spiritual boons is unquestionably necessary during this initial period, as it mightily stimulates intellectual interests, awakens inactive minds and inspires them to advance. As essential and beneficial is the ideological mood in time when the task on the agenda is to develop a national self-awareness. In the case of nations, whose national development is cramped, nationalism always assumes an ideological character and not infrequently becomes a genuine ideology with a consummate system of ideas. Such, for instance, are the Polish and Ukrainian nationalist ideologies...

When an empire makes of the intellectual a hired worker, his protest is identical with that of the day labourer against his master

Proceeding therefrom, one may generally state that the more narrow an ideology may be, the more definite its problems are timed for the current historical task of the epoch, the more productive it will be and the more capable of playing a major part in a nation's progressive advance. This concept is confirmed also by the example of the ideologies that emerged in the second half of the 1850s. In the foreground here is Narodism (Russian Populism) which incorporated elements of both Slavophilism and Westernism.

Narodism in its various forms, along with other kindred, though not narrowly Narodist, trends instrumentally contributed to the history of our ideological and moral development, moreover, not only by virtue of their direct or indirect impact, but also by virtue of the circumstance that they were a most original underivative product of Russian ideology-making... Its crisis, which erupted in the 1880s, exacerbated in the 1890s and still continues, is that of Russian ideology-making generally. It did everything it could and should possibly do, rendering unforgettable and inestimable service to our intellectual and moral progress. Taking a retrospective glance, we may say that our ideologies were in this country the paramount motive force behind this progress throughout the entire 19th century. By now their role has been played out, and dawning is a new epoch, when taking their place are political parties in the European sense, while the enlightening mission of ideologies is yielding to a broader cultural activity by intellectuals motivated already not by one or another ideological doctrine, but by the lofty spiritual blessings, convincing them that it is essential to spread these blessings as broadly as possible amongst the masses of the people.

Currently this type of intellectual, who entertains no definite ideology, but who professes quite definite principles, who holds definite social and political views, is becoming more and more common. Of course, ideological searchings have not vanished and scarcely will ever do so, but now they fall only to the individual, to the amateur, as was the case earlier, in the 18th century, and they are motivated primarily by overall philosophical and religious themes... Receding into the past along with the old Russia are also those old ideological controversies which either substituted for real activity, or attended activity and inactivity.

Party arithmetics

Tatiana Ivanova

"Millions of ordinary Communists are not to blame for anything," I am told...

I recall the mail editor of the Radio Committee, where I first tried my hand as a journalist, reporting: "Over the past week, the programme *Fairy-Tale World* drew 12,000 letters; the *Listeners' Choice* concert, 40,000 letters; the *Health Talk* programme, 45,000 letters; and the *Lenin University for Millions,* one letter."

The incident, thirty years old and all but forgotten, has come back to me today because every time I turn on my radio or my TV set or open a newspaper I hear or see phrases like: "Millions of ordinary Communists are not to blame for anything," "Under no circumstances should millions of honest Communists be persecuted or put under moral pressure." Some statistics sound downright alarming: If sixteen million Communists undergo persecutions, we are told, their families, relatives and friends will suffer, too, thus tripling or even quadrupling the total number of those who take the blame. The result will be a nationwide witch-hunt...

"*The Lenin University for Millions,* one letter." Remember?

A coup d'etat has been attempted in the country. The President of the Soviet Union was interned. The President of Russia, together with the government of Russia, was besieged in the Russian parliament building. One-sixth of the globe was in danger of being taken over by a, let's say, no-joke regime. The capital of the state was defiled by tanks. There were people killed and wounded. People went through a shock, humiliation, fear, a nightmare. The world found inself on the brink of a disaster. And all that was the work of the Communists.

Today, 14 people are under investigation, as far as I know. The other members of the once ruling and now "homeless" Party ought to feel rather embarrassed, I presume, but many obviously don't, by the look of them. At the Supreme Soviet session and, later, at the congress they took the floor one after another and demanded, with enviable persistance, that those under investigation should be given a chance "to set forth their views" right there and then, for all the nation to hear. Without batting an eyelash, they referred to the junta members as "comrades": "Let Comrade Kryuchkov set forth his point of view!" "Give Comrade Yazov a chance to speak his mind here in front of us, he is our comrade after all!"

Every "comrade speaker" declared against persecuting and infringing upon the rigths of millions of honest ordinary Communists who are not to blame for anything.

In my world – in Moscow streets, in a large block of flats, in editorial offices, stores, the subway and buses – nobody persecutes or humiliates anyone at all. So I do not quite see what the leaders of the now homeless Party are so concerned about. And when heard from the democrats, the calls for not persecuting the Communists and not "infringing upon their rights" sound irrelevant and coy.

It would be disgusting, of course, to call for vengeance. However, it is immoral to leave a heinous crime uninvestigated. If society sees that a dozen or so scapegoats take all the blame for the sin committed by a huge body of their kindred spirits, society will be totally demoralized.

I am certain that if committees of inquiry are now investigating anything at all, it is not conspirators' Party affiliation but the degree of their implication in the criminal coup attempt only. Therefore, the yells of "Do not persecute!" are nothing but an attempt to bring moral pressure to bear on the investigators.

As to the millions of ordinary Communists, I am sure they are not, indeed, to blame for anything. They only paid Party dues, i.e., maintained the Party's district, regional and republican committees at their own expense. They went to Party meetings and raised their hands when asked: "Who's for?" When non-Party masses raised their voice, they kept silent, hypnotized by the Party organizer's fixed stare. If a strike was called, the "ordinary Party members" dutifully went to work, running the gauntlet of the strikers' scorn. That was all. So what are they expected to do now?

Millions of honest ordinary Communists did not surrender their Party cards either after Tbilisi, after Vilnius, or after the tank invasion of Moscow on March 28. Those millions are probably naive enough not to see any connection between shovels and tanks, on the one hand, and Party cards, on the other. So they experienced neither shock, nor shame. Even when offered an emergency exit – first by Lysenko and Shostakovsky with their Democratic Platform, then by Rutskoy with his Democratic Communist Party, and finally by Shevardnadze with his "movement" – those very honest and very ordinary people did not use it. Even after their General Secretary had been arrested and all the non-Party people asked one another, by way of greeting: "Is he alive? Have they killed him? Are they going to kill him? Are they killing him now?", when all the dissident, imperfect, drinking, anti-socialist masses were frantic with worry for the Communists' General Secretary and their own far-from-irreproachable President, even on those tense days those ordinary and honest comrades, those millions of Communists, in no way manifested their presence among those who cared. None of them took to the streets and shouted: "We Communists are with you! Do not believe our Central Committee!"

What's even more – after the building of their Party's Central Committee had been sealed off, the ordinary, honest Communists held not a single meeting, even a tiny one, in its defence.

It is non-existent, this Party. Millions of those honest and ordinary people do not feel like Communists at all. There are only functionaries who, as ever, cover themselves up by millions. May I conclude with that highly indicative phrase: "*The Lenin University for Millions.* One letter."

President Lech Walesa of Poland has decorated Lord **Nicholas Bethell,** a British subject, member of the European Parliament and our permanent contributor, with the National Cross of the order "For Services." During the years of communist regimes in East European countries the British aristocrat and prominent human rights activist did everything in his power to help the Solidarity movement, and investigated the circumstances of the Katyn tragedy. For his books, articles and essays on Polish history Lord Bethell was included in the blacklists of the Jaruzelski government, and when he visited Poland in 1988 during the strikes at the Gdansk shipyards, he openly confronted the authorities and was arrested.

Several days before the gala ceremony of decoration it suddenly turned out that the order sent to the Polish Embassy in London was of the "old make" and had the words "The People's Republic of Poland" engraved on it. Ironically, Lord Bethell nearly received an award of the Communist government. A new order was immediately sent for.

When Lord Bethell learnt about the coup attempt in the Soviet Union on August 19, he called Yeltsin at the Russian White House and expressed admiration of his "courage and resolution."

Later he addressed an open letter to the Russian president which read: ...The European Community must be able to cooperate with Russia and the countries lying between them... to set up a fully integrated Europe, whose economy would develop at unprecedented rates surpassing Japan or the countries of the Pacific region. Lord Bethell also called for reducing the activity of the Soviet intelligence service on the continent, since he believes Soviet espionage in the West had grown in scale during Gorbachev's rule.

* * *

Thirty-four-year-old **Alexander Barkhatov,** the author of the documentary *Along the Line of Life,* the first sincere film about the Afghan war on TV, says that he has never belonged either to the right or to the left wing. He always wore "democratic" clothes and appeared at work only in his jeans and leather jacket, so that they would send someone more impressive to the Kremlin.

For his reports Barkhatov chooses "hot spots": Nagorny Karabakh, Checheno-Ingushetiya, Moldova and the Baltics. He made reports in Romania during the revolution and worked in Iraq side by side with the famous Peter Arnett from CNN.

Alexander has just returned from the Antarctic, where he took part in saving an expedition and the crew of the research vessel *Mikhail Somov* stuck fast in the ice close to the Soviet research station Molodezhnaya. The IL-76 cargo plane with a rescue party and journalists aboard took off from Capetown. Not every plane can reach the shores of the Antarctic in winter and land safely on the snow.

In Barkhatov's new "hot spot" report you will learn how the overloaded IL-76 (instead of the planned two flights the plane had to evacuate all the winterers at once) managed to take off while the wind reached 27 meters a second.

* * *

A businessman and historian from Bangladesh, Dr **Saful Hoque,** has set up

Together with Chekhov at the Amur Coaching Inn

Forty-nine-year-old theater critic **Bella Kleshchenko** has become president of the recently founded Chekhov fund in Siberia. Last year Bella carried out a task for *NT* and repeated the travel of Anton Chekhov from Moscow to Sakhalin. During her expedition she found out that the house in Irkutsk decorated with a memorial plaque is not the one where Chekhov lived 100 years ago. Kleshchenko found the building of the former Amur Coaching Inn hotel, where the writer did stay and suggested turning it into a literary museum named after A. Chekhov. With the assistance of the fund and of professor of Yale University in the US Robert Jackson an international Chekhov festival will be held in Irkutsk next year.

Bella Kleshchenko was born in besieged Leningrad. She graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Theater, Music and Cinematography. She spent ten years working with a youth newspaper on the Kamchatka peninsula. After that she came to Moscow to defend a paper on Chekhov's plays at the A.M.Gorky Institute of World Literature.

The first event organized by the fund's president Kleshchenko at the end of September is named "Latvia is leaving Siberia." A group of writers, scientists, physicians, artists and journalists will sail on board the *Latvia* steamer down the Yenisei river from Krasnoyarsk. Bella hopes that as a result of this trip a number of outpatient clinics will be opened in Siberia, as well as a school named after Chekhov, where people from the Baltic republics deported by Stalin to Siberia in the 1930s will be able to learn their mother tongue.

B. Kleshchenko is writing a book *All of Russia Is Turning to Dr Chekhov,* which she plans to later make into a documentary.

his firm Global Computer and Electronics Inc., in Moscow, even though he could have chosen West European and Asian capitals for the start of his business.

In the late 1960s fifteen-year-old Saful illegally crossed the border from East Pakistan to India, as a member of a guerrilla detachment. Having received military training there he returned home to fight against Islamabad's troops. He was wounded and hospitalized. Following the victory of the 1971 revolution and the establishment of Bangladesh where East Pakistan used to be, Saful came to study at Kiev University. He gradueted from the department of international relations and then finished a post-graduate course at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He received a flattering offer to continue his studies as an assistant professor. But refused. He likewise refused to go to Geneva or to an economics school in Britain. He stayed in Moscow and became a businessman.

Saful is used to the absurdity of the Soviet economy and banking system – he has lived here since the time of deep stagnation and therefore has obvious advantages over those businessmen who are only just now getting accustomed to the market of the country that is falling apart. Saful plans to found an international club The Soviet Union's Problems, where his collegues will receive the advice of an experienced businessman and former guerrilla.

V. Brel

* * *

No matter how lax is the behaviour of women who engage in the most ancient trade, they too can get into trouble. The news that the famous German prostitute, 45-year-old **Domenica,** decided to change her occupation and become a social worker, has caused a sensation. "I cannot spend all my life pampering men," she says. "It's about time I thought of my collegues." This, however, does not mean that the Hamburg prostitute will never again be seen in Reeperbahn – a street in Hansa town where hundreds of night cabarets, sex-shops and Kontakthofs are concentrated – the main place of work of prostitutes. Domenica will now engage in social defence of those priestesses of love who take drugs. Only now, contrary to the past, Domenica's work day will begin in the morning. The social department which hired Domenica did not make much fuss that she had no higher or specialized secondary education. Her rich experience speaks for itself.

* * *

In the past few months 38-year-old astrologer **Pavel Globa** has repeatedly predicted the beginning of a counter-revolutionary coup. In predicting the August events he was a month wrong. Or was it the junta that altered the date of the coup when it learnt of Globa's forecast?

Despite his own gloomy forecasts, Globa re-married. His wife was born in the year of the Rooster.

Pavel says that he prefers intelligent women. "If the woman is dumb like a duck her place is at the farm where ducks live," believes the astrologer. As far as his divorce with his intelligent first wife Tamara goes, Pavel says that two personalities cannot live under the same roof. However, their separation does not prevent them from observing the night sky together, since they remain close spiritual allies.

According to the horoscope Pavel is a Cancer and a Snake. He was born

in Moscow and graduated from the Moscow Institute for Historian-Archivists. He worked as a night watchman and a janitor. But astrology proved to be his strongest passion.

Pavel Globa predicts that in February 1992 there's going to be another coup. "If we live through the February events with dignity," he says, "life will become much easier." And he adds: "If the year of the Sheep carries the Soviet people safely over the precipice three years wide, we will land gently on its other side in the year of the Black Dog, which symbolizes the guard of Law and Order." But not of the Kryuchkov and Pugo type.

Pavel supports Yeltsin. He believes that Yeltsin "is at present the most veritable leader," which, as a matter of fact, is obvious even without the help of astrology. At the same time Globa believes that Yeltsin is "too quick-tempered and active and he needs to be balanced by a more reserved person like Silayev."

Globa considers himself to be a man of extremes and even an adventurist. "Otherwise I wouldn't have worked my way up," he explains. "In the past 2.5 years I've heard more dirt poured on me than in my whole life".

A. Pyasetskaya

A sequence turned upside down – and the film is shelved

Not so long ago film director **Henrikas Sablevicius** was the "champion" in the number of films "shelved." The powers-that-be of Soviet cinematography were sure that his films were all about dissidents, although the director himself believes that his characters are ordinary people.

The documentary *Apolinaras* shot in 1973 was banned because the hero did not fit the stereotype of a Soviet militiaman. The film *Everything's fine, Everything's Okay!* was shelved because of Henrikas' joke at the end of the film, where he turned one sequence upside down. Members of the commission decided that a happy and contented person had no reason to stand on his head. And in the *Sunny Circle* the censors did not like "the openly plain Soviet people." Nor did they like the snow with a darkening wood in the background, in which the high commissions saw a hint of the struggle of the Lithuanian people for independence.

Sablevicius has never concealed his attitude to Lithuania's position in the USSR. "Nobody can rob a person of his natural right to live and be free." For the past three decades he has been teaching students of the Conservatoire and future film directors something that he believes and knows to be true. And he is proud that none of his students agreed to work with the Lithuanian TV occupied last winter by the landing troops and "the national salvation committee."

"Paradise Cloud" over Lago Maggiore

Poor Kolya gets the Silver Leopard

Neya Zorkaya

Imagine yourself in a far-off land of fantastic scenic beauty, watching a movie in an extraordinary cinema.

In that cinema, with the pitch-black southern sky for a ceiling, the seats are arranged in neat rows right on the pavement. Ancient palaces, framing the square, serve as its walls, and their balconies as boxes. A huge luminous screen makes the "interior" complete. Stars begin to twinkle in the sky one after another, the lights in the palaces go out, but the movie goes on far into the night...

The place is Piazza Grande, the centre of the town of Locarno, Switzerland, near the Italian border, the venue of the 44th International Film Festival. The annual Locarno festival is among Europe's oldest and most respected ones; it has a unique individuality, traditions and a special charm all its own, its purpose being to encourage new trends in the cinema art, new artistic quests, and young talent. Despite its venerable age, the Locarno festival is ever young, genuinely democratic and devoid of any snobism; one will not see there stars and fashions on parade and other such things which we, Soviet journalists, always attribute to "bourgeois" film festivals as distinct from the "truly democratic" ones. Although patronized by people in very high places, including President Flavio Kotti of the Swiss Confederation, and sponsored by the Union of Swiss Banks, no less, and companies like Philip Morris, the Locarno festival did not strike me as "commercialized" or otherwise "capitalist" at all, in our stereotyped meaning of the word. Unless, of course, capitalism means efficiency: all the viewings, press conferences, "round tables" get-togethers, receptions and functions adding up to produce the festival's festive but extremely business-like atmosphere were superbly organized. Any information was readily available, advertising left nothing to be desired, the papers reviewed all the entries almost instantly, and each festival participant was offered a basic catalogue of the current film programme...

The Russian Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange, the sponsor of the 16th Moscow Film Festival, cannot stand comparison with Swiss banks so far; our posters and magazines pale next to the Locarno printshops' glossy and colourful products; but surely it is within the powers of our own festival organizers to offer their guests courteous service at least. In Locarno, young but strict ticket collectors never raised their voices at those who tried to sneak in – they just stared the offenders out of countenance.

We cannot provide for our Russian film festivals a background like the dark-blue Lago Maggiore Lake surrounded by the Alps, their green slopes dotted with chapels and toy-like homes displaying baskets of flowers in their windows; everything there bears the imprint of a 600-year-old culture carefully preserved by generations. But we have also got quite a few picturesque places (perhaps more of them than tiny Switzerland does) fit to become art centres and festival venues, and for all the advantages of metropolitan festivals like those held in Moscow and Berlin, small towns or health resorts are, without a doubt, eminently suitable for such occasions. In August the cinema virtually reigns supreme in Locarno. The viewings of competition films in the large and modern hall of the Fevi sports complex are paralleled by movie shows in all the town cinemas and by a regular annual retrospective of pictures by a world classic – this time by the great French film director Jacques Becker, known to our cinemagoers by his "Montparnasse, 19" and "Antoine et Antoinette." The sights of Canton Ticino, where Locarno is situated, are made good use of: grand receptions on the festival opening and closing days are held in the medieval castle of Casa Visconti, which used to belong to the rulers of Lombardy, the ancestors of the celebrated film director Luchino Visconti. All the streets and house walls are pasted over with posters and placards carrying pictures of a leopard or decorated with a spotty leopard-skin pattern: the beautiful beast is the emblem of the festival. The Locarno prizes – Golden, Silver and Bronze Leopards – go with a cash award in heavy Swiss francs.

Festival film programmes began early every morning and continued in uninterrupted succession, following a complicated schedule, until night, when the focus of universal attention shifted to Piazza Grande under the canopy of the starry sky, reserved for the show of non-competition selections, classical masterpieces, and Cannes '91 prize winners.

This time the festival was keynoted by themes which have turned out to be not only our own exclusive concerns – youth, combating sex and violence on the screen, promoting humaneness and kindness through the cinema. Most of the films were about youths and teenagers, who strike out on their own and gradually gain life experience the hard way. A panorama of the planet, viewed from that angle and impressive by its scale, unfolded itself on the cinema screens of a cozy and prosperous Locarno. The French-Algerian film *Cheb* (Young) tells the story of a 19-year-old boy, an Algerian by origin and citizenship, raised in France as a true Frenchman, who ends up an alien in both countries. The West German *Ostkreuz* (Eastern Cross) is a film about a German girl who flees form the GDR to the West (before reunification) only to become a marginal in the free world, which turns out to be a gloomy refugee camp, and who stubbornly resists moral degradation. One film is about two teenagers, a boy and his sister, who eke out a miserable existence at the end of the world, near the Straits of Magellan, on a tract of unromantic wasteland exposed to the four winds. In the Italian picture *The Noose,* a boy is shocked to discover so much falsehood behind the respectable

"Johnny Suede," winner of the Golden Leopard '91

facade of Italian high society. The hero of the French movie *The Year of Awakening*, a World War II orphan, goes through a ruthless school of life, first in the barracks of a military academy, where it's no use begging for mercy, and later in combat action in the much-suffering Indo-China. This last picture is one of the few festival films set in the recent past, in the 1940s, for the most part, the films reproduced present-day reality.

What struck the eye was the pictures' strong emphasis on social problems, their call for humaneness, the attention they pay to the less fortunate, to the festering wounds and ills of human society. We regarded this as an exclusive characteristic of the Soviet cinema, but we were proved wrong. It was, perhaps, only in one Canadian picture, called "H" (the abbreviation for the narcotic drug of heroin), that the depiction of fear, hell and moral disintegration of a pair of addicts, confined to a kind of a heroin grave, is doomed to suggest certain ambiguity, balancing on the verge of pathological naturalism and as it were, aestheticization of vice. All the other works are pure and conceptually straightforward and breathe such a genuine concern for the good of society that even the strictest guardian of Komsomol morals would not find fault with them.

Golden Leopard '91 went to the American film *Johnny Suede* by Tom Dicillo, who had his debut at the festival, and Silver Leopard to our *Paradise Cloud* by Nikolai Dostal. Here are some details.

To begin with, the Locarno festival had always been favourably disposed towards the Soviet cinema, and many of our directors became its laureates (or "palmares," as they were called there). Last year, Svetlana Proskurina of St. Petersburg got a Golden Leopard for her *Valse Accidentelle* (Accidental Waltz), and in accordance with the accepted ritual, became a member of the official jury this year. Classical retrospectives, which are conducted with academic seriousness in Locarno, recently included those of pictures by Boris Barnet and Lev Kuleshov. This year, every Soviet participant sensed virtual waves of sympathy for, and interest in, our country. In particular, I was invited to sit on the international ecumenical (Christian) jury introduced as "a team of three Protestants, three Catholics and, for the first time in Locarno, one Russian Orthodox believer." Fortunately, the "team" was composed of charming people well versed in cinema art.

The competition programme featured two new movies – the above-mentioned *Paradise Cloud* and *Geese* (the latter being the debut of Lidiya Bobrova, a graduate of the Higher School of Film Direction), plus a number of non-competition pictures, including Karen Gevorkyan's *The Piebald Dog Running on the Edge of the Sea*, the first prize winner in Moscow.

I am sorry for Lidiya, a charming personality, whose excellent picture, a product of conscientious and dedicated effort, went over well with the public and received good press, but was "tripped," as it happens, by another Soviet film, *Paradise Cloud*. The lot as to which of the two films should be shown first fell on the latter and, quite unexpectedly even to us, it became the absolute favourite of the festival. A simple story of Kolya, a guy who did not know what to do with himself, and out of sheer boredom, hoaxed his neighbours into believing that he was about to leave his drab home town for the romantic Far East – and found himself in an awkward position as a result – was a tremendous success. The audience was infected by the director's love for his characters, appreciated his warm sense of humour and the emotional mood of that very Russian picture, steeped in the Gogol and Chekhov traditions. The critics immediately announced Dostal's film to be the most likely Golden Leopard prize winner. Ovations in the cinemas, press ratings, excitement in the foyers – everything augured well for the *Paradise Cloud*. It was only two days before the finale that the American Johnny Suede, also a young, immensely likeable, self-seeking, funny and melancholy failure, beat our hero, with the result that Kolya had to content himself with the Silver Leopard.

Nikolai Dostal (and, consequently, his hero, played by Andrei Zhigalov who caught everyone's fancy) made up for it by winning a lot of other prizes and diplomas of honour awarded by the ecumenical jury (unanimously), the jury of the young, the jury of the FIPRESCI (the International Federation of the Cinematographic Press) and of the International Feature and Experimental Film Confederation... Nikolai Dostal ascented to the stage in front of the huge Piazza Grande screen five times, to stormy applause.

* * *

We left Locarno by plane on August 18, in a triumphant mood.

Then came the morning of August 19... Still our fortunate *Paradise Cloud* flew over the tragic days. It was not for nothing that over there, in that beautiful Alpine valley, the film had been referred to as a symbol of a "shared Hope."

The muzhik and the prefect

At the outset of perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev shocked the world by saying that there were 18 million bureaucrats in the USSR

Democrats were against bureaucrats and campaigned against them among the people. Finally, the people decided to replace the hateful bureaucrats by democrats on the assumption that the latter knew what the people wanted.

As a result, democrats defeated bureaucrats and got down to work satisfying the people's needs.

They decided it was their primary goal to draw the outside world's attention to themselves and to the people. That was why each of the three Baltic Republics immediately established diplomatic relations with the leading Western countries – with eighteen of them, it seems. That necessitated 18 embassy buildings in each of the three Baltic capitals and in addition, for 18x3 Baltic ambassadors, 18x3 first secretaries, 18x3 attaches, counsellors, security officers, etc., who will go to work in Western capitals. Also needed, of course, are staffs for the ministries of foreign affairs. And it would certainly be stupid to think that there will be military attaches without ministries of defence. Other ministries will be needed too, of course.

Democrats are no bureaucrats, however, and it is obvious that not all the 160 countries of the world will have their embassies in Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn. Otherwise every second nice building will fly a foreign flag, and the Baltic capitals' population will consist entirely of ministry officials and foreign diplomats.

There is no cause for anxiety, however: Baltic peasants are noted for their industriousness and even if only a few of them remain, they will manage to feed the diplomatic corps. As a last resort, they can always turn to the Scandinavians for help.

The situation in Moscow is more complicated than that. Although the number of diplomats will grow a little owing to Russia setting up a foreign ministry of its own and all the independent sovereign republics (plus, perhaps, Bashkortostan, the Crimean Khanate and the Yakutian Shamanate) opening their embassies in the city, Moscow faces another danger. Mayor Gavriil Popov has decided to expand his staff way beyond the Muscovites' need for it.

To what extent the Moscow City Council and the related organizations (such as the oversized "Moscow Government") have increased their staffs as compared with the former Executive Committee is anybody's guess. Further developments, however, can be predicted on the basis of Parkinson's law.

The municipal authorities are expanding their premises to include several more buildings: the former CMEA headquarters, the former Lenin Museum and the Kuntsevo-2 suburban complex, which used to be Brezhnev's country residence. According to Parkinson, however, an organization which fills up all the premises allotted to it promptly demands more.

Therefore, by dividing the total floorspace of these buildings into the number of square metres required for the functioning of one democrat, we shall get the number of new bureaucrats.

This, in spite of the fact that Muscovites are still pretty hard up for housing. But wait a minute: aren't phrases like "housing shortage" and "food shortage" just populist demagogy?

What I am doing now is pure science. I am working out a method of calculating the number of bureaucrats on the territory of what used to be the USSR. Now it is difficult to arrive at the final conclusions so far. We are now going through a period of transition. It is rather easy to count the number of diplomats and city hall officials. It is quite clear, for instance, that the number of defence ministers, as well as of their first, second and third deputies, will grow fifteen times.

All the rest is vague and unstable. One thing is clear: before very long, the number of bureaucrats on one-sixth of the globe will surpass that before perestroika and before the Revolution several times over. Members of the now disbanded Communist Party can be expected soon to start spreading revolutionary propaganda from underground against the corrupt bureaucratic system. And a new Lenin will quote a satirical tale by a new Saltykov-Shchedrin about one farmer feeding two prefects.

D. Allin

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

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

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